Unreasonable Access: Disguised Issue Advocacy and the First Amendment Status of Broadcasters by Monroe, Kerry L.
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 25 Volume XXV 
Number 1 Volume XXV Book 1 Article 3 
2014 
Unreasonable Access: Disguised Issue Advocacy and the First 
Amendment Status of Broadcasters 
Kerry L. Monroe 
Yale University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kerry L. Monroe, Unreasonable Access: Disguised Issue Advocacy and the First Amendment Status of 
Broadcasters, 25 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 117 (2014). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol25/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Unreasonable Access: Disguised Issue Advocacy and the First Amendment 
Status of Broadcasters 
Cover Page Footnote 
Ph.D. candidate in Law, class of 2016, Yale University; J.D., 2010, University of Michigan Law School. I 
would like to thank Floyd Abrams, Jack Balkin, Vince Blasi, Molly Brady, Rebecca Crootof, Zach Herz, Eric 
Fish, Robert Post, Richard Primus, Reva Siegel, Gordon Silverstein, Rory Van Loo, and participants in the 
2014 Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference at Yale Law School for their comments on earlier 
drafts of this Article. In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I represented the broadcasters 
who were subject to the October 2012 FCC decisions discussed in this Article, along with my former 
colleagues at Covington & Burling LLP. Accordingly, I would also like to thank Kurt Wimmer, Eve Pogoriler, 
and Dustin Cho for their efforts in the trenches alongside me. 
This article is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol25/iss1/3 
  117 
 
Unreasonable Access: Disguised Issue 
Advocacy and the First Amendment 
Status of Broadcasters 




I.  CANDIDATE POLITICAL BROADCASTING 
RIGHTS .................................................... 131 
A.  History and Purposes of Statutory Political 
Broadcasting Rights .................................................. 131 
1.  Equal Opportunities for Candidates for 
Elective Office .................................................. 133 
2.  Reasonable Access and Lowest Unit Rate ........134 
B.  Regulatory Implementation of Reasonable Access ......... 136 
C.  Court Consideration of the Constitutionality of 
Reasonable Access ..................................................... 139 
1.  CBS, Inc. v. FCC and Its Precursors ................ 139 
2.  Developments Since CBS, Inc. v. FCC ........... 142 
II.  GAMING THE SYSTEM—PRETEXTUAL 
CANDIDATES ............................................ 145 
                                                                                                                            
*  Ph.D. candidate in Law, class of 2016, Yale University; J.D., 2010, University of 
Michigan Law School. I would like to thank Floyd Abrams, Jack Balkin, Vince Blasi, 
Molly Brady, Rebecca Crootof, Zach Herz, Eric Fish, Robert Post, Richard Primus, Reva 
Siegel, Gordon Silverstein, Rory Van Loo, and participants in the 2014 Freedom of 
Expression Scholars Conference at Yale Law School for their comments on earlier drafts 
of this Article. In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I represented the 
broadcasters who were subject to the October 2012 FCC decisions discussed in this 
Article, along with my former colleagues at Covington & Burling LLP. Accordingly, I 
would also like to thank Kurt Wimmer, Eve Pogoriler, and Dustin Cho for their efforts in 
the trenches alongside me. 
118 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXV:117 
A.  Incentives to Game the System ...................................145 
B.  FCC Tolerance of Pretextual Candidates .................. 149 
III. WALKING THE TIGHTROPE OF BROADCAST 
REGULATION ............................................. 153 
A.  Pursuing Communications Policy Through 
Structural Regulation ...............................................154 
1.  The Origin of Congress’s Regulatory Power 
Over Broadcast ................................................. 155 
a)  Beyond Scarcity .................................... 156 
b)  Choosing a Regulatory Scheme .............158 
2.  Regulating Broadcast to Pursue 
Communications Policy .................................... 163 
B.  Reasonable Access and the Means-Ends Fit of the 
Commission’s Prophylactic Rule ................................ 170 
1.  The Ends of Reasonable Access ....................... 171 
2.  The Commission’s Employment of Its 
Prophylactic Rule ............................................. 172 




Perched atop a mountain in rural West Virginia is a large, gray-
ing, cinderblock bunkhouse that served as the unlikely shooting lo-
cation for over a dozen television commercials in the months prior 
to the 2012 federal primary and general elections.1 This is the com-
pound of Randall Terry, founder in the 1980s of the notorious anti-
abortion organization Operation Rescue, known for massive side-
walk protests of women’s clinics and attention-seeking stunts that 
included delivering a dead fetus to Bill Clinton at the 1992 Demo-
cratic National Convention.2 Following the contentious splintering 
of Operation Rescue in the 1990s and accompanying legal and fi-
nancial troubles, Terry appears to have lost much of his influence 
                                                                                                                            
1 See Matt Labash, Randall Terry Shoots an Ad, WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 22, 2012, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/randall-terry-shoots-ad_654411.html. 
2 Id.; see also Jacqueline L. Salmon, Antiabortion Leader Randall Terry Returns, Using 
Same Old Incendiary Tactics, WASH. POST, July 15, 2009, http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/14/AR2009071403317.html. 
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within the anti-abortion activism community.3 But while he may no 
longer attract enormous numbers of protesters to stand alongside 
him, he and his allies are learning to reach more listeners with few-
er speakers. Where they once attracted media coverage of the pro-
tests they staged, they now seek direct access to the airwaves.4 
During recent election seasons, Terry and his allies have pre-
sented themselves as candidates for federal elective office and have 
invoked statutory candidate access rights to force broadcasters to 
air graphic anti-abortion television advertisements—ads that many 
broadcasters would otherwise have refused to carry for a variety of 
reasons.5 These reasons included concerns about content that 
could misinform or antagonize viewers and material in the ads that 
was potentially defamatory or allegedly violated copyrights held by 
third parties.6 Ordinarily, members of the public have no right to 
speak on broadcast television stations, whether such access is 
sought for commercial, political, or other purposes. Broadcasters 
have no statutory or regulatory obligations to permit general public 
access to their stations, and, moreover, the Supreme Court has in-
                                                                                                                            
3 See Salmon, supra note 2. 
4 Direct access also carries with it the benefit of controlling one’s message. See Jack 
M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the 
Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2004) (“[I]n a world dominated by mass 
media, the recurring problem for people who want to speak effectively and reach large 
numbers of people is how to gain access to an effective podium. People can purchase 
access if they own a significant amount of property; in the alternative, they can stage 
media events to draw the mass media’s attention. In the latter case, however, speakers 
cannot easily control their message.”). 
5 See Jennifer Preston, Randall Terry Loses His Delegate to the Democratic Convention, 
N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Mar. 16, 2012, 8:58 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/03/16/randall-terry-loses-his-delegate-to-the-democratic-convention/?_php=true
&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
6 Broadcasters take a number of considerations into account when evaluating orders 
for time by commercial and political advertisers, including concerns about misinforming 
or antagonizing viewers, failure of ads to meet certain legal requirements, including 
Federal Elections Commission and Federal Communications Commission rules 
pertaining to sponsorship disclosure, and station liability resulting from publication of 
defamatory material or material violating intellectual property rights of third parties. The 
ads aired by Terry and his allies in 2012 raised a number of these concerns. See, e.g., 
Letter from Charles J. Harder, Counsel for Samuel L. Jackson, to WPLG (Oct. 15, 2012) 
(on file with author) (alleging that statements made in a Terry ad aired by the station were 
defamatory of Mr. Jackson); Letter from Joseph E. Sandler, Counsel for Jewish Council 
on Education and Research, to Station Manager, WPLG (Oct. 14, 2012) (on file with 
author) (alleging that the use of video in a Terry ad violated the Council’s copyright). 
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dicated that such a right-of-access system could be constitutionally 
problematic.7 Candidates for federal elective office, however, do 
have a statutory right to purchase, at preferential rates and without 
broadcaster censorship, a “reasonable” amount of airtime on 
broadcast television stations during the windows preceding prima-
ry and general elections.8 Although admittedly uninterested in 
winning any elections,9 Terry spotted in these political broadcast-
ing rights an opportunity to gain inexpensive, forced access to 
broadcast stations to “use . . . FCC laws for federal candidates to 
bring America face-to-face with [abortion].”10 
Following a 2010 “prototype” effort that he deemed a re-
sounding success,11 Terry recruited fellow anti-abortion activists to 
present themselves as write-in or ballot candidates in federal races 
in order to buy airtime on broadcast television stations.12 In 2012 a 
                                                                                                                            
7 See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 126–27 
(1973) (expressing concerns that broad public access rights for individuals or groups 
wishing to discuss public issues would require significant Federal Communications 
Commission oversight of the day-to-day operations of broadcasters, including “deciding 
such questions as whether a particular individual or group has had a sufficient opportunity 
to present its viewpoint and whether a particular viewpoint has already been sufficiently 
aired”); see also Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673–74 (1998) 
(noting that broad public rights of access would be inconsistent with the editorial 
discretion broadcasters exercise in the selection and presentation of their programming). 
8 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(7), 315(a), 315(b) (2012). The political broadcasting statutes 
and regulations are discussed in detail in Part I. 
9 Preston, supra note 5. 
10 Kevin Derby, Pro-Life Activist Randall Terry Looks to Defeat Barack Obama in 2012 
Dem Primaries, SUNSHINE STATE NEWS (Jan. 18, 2011, 11:28 AM), 
http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/story/pro-life-activist-randall-terry-looks-defeat-
barack-obama-2012-dem-primaries. 
11 In 2010, Terry ally Missy Smith was on the ballot as the Republican candidate for the 
District of Columbia non-voting congressional seat, despite a request from D.C. 
Republican Party leadership that she not run. Her entire “campaign” effort consisted of 
purchasing broadcast television airtime to air graphic anti-abortion advertisements 
written and produced by Terry. Tim Murphy, Aborted Fetuses to Star in 2012 Election Ads, 
MOTHER JONES, Nov. 17, 2011, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/11/graphic-
anti-abortion-ads-randall-terry-fcc; Mike DeBonis, Smith’s Anti-abortion Ads Bring 
Culture Wars Into D.C. Delegate Race, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2010, 6:58 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/28/AR201010280
6339.html; Dugald McConnell & Brian Todd, Graphic Anti-Abortion Ads Air on 
Washington Stations, CNN (Oct. 27, 2010, 5:26 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2010/POLITICS/10/26/anti.abortion.ads/index.html. 
12 See Murphy, supra note 11; see also Press Release, Terry for President, Recruiting 
Candidates to Suppress Obama’s Vote in Florida – Key to Obama Losing Florida is 
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group of twelve of these activists, including Terry himself, pur-
chased time in at least eighteen media markets.13 The races entered 
by these “candidates” appear to have been chosen largely accord-
ing to a strategy having more to do with the potential media impact 
of their ad buys than with any interest in holding a particular office 
or representing a particular set of voters.14 For example, during the 
general election, Terry was on the ballot for Congress in the heavi-
ly populated 23rd district of Florida (despite being a West Virginia 
resident),15 and was also on the ballot for President in three “safe 
Romney states” that border swing states—West Virginia, Ken-
                                                                                                                            
Suppressing his Catholic Democrat Vote (May 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.christiannewswire.com/news/1203019704.html. 
13 Press Release, Terry for President Campaign Committee, Graphic 
Halloween/Horror ‘Obama Nightmare’ Ad Airs in 7 Battleground States (Oct. 31, 2012), 
available at http://www.christiannewswire.com/index.php?module=releases&task=
view&releaseID=70771. A search of the FCC database of station political files at 
stations.fcc.gov shows that Andrew Beacham placed orders on stations in the Louisville 
Nielsen Designated Market Area (Louisville “DMA”) and Evansville DMA; Gary 
Boisclair in Minneapolis-St. Paul DMA (during the primary election window only); David 
Lewis in Cincinnati DMA; David Macko in Cleveland DMA; Angela Michael in St. Louis 
DMA; Randall Terry in Amarillo DMA, Boston DMA, Chicago DMA, Cincinnati DMA, 
Denver DMA, Miami-Ft. Lauderdale DMA, Nashville DMA, Pittsburgh DMA, 
Washington, D.C. DMA, West Palm Beach DMA; and Stan Vaughan in Las Vegas DMA. 
The results of this search are significantly underinclusive, largely due to circumstances 
related to the 2012 implementation of FCC rules requiring station political files to be 
made available online. In the press release cited in this footnote, Terry claims that Alan 
Aversa and George Krail also ran the ads he produced in Iowa and Western Illinois; 
Virginia Fuller ran them in San Francisco, California; Russell Best ran them in Reno, 
Nevada; and Daniel Botelho ran them in Boston, Massachusetts and New Hampshire. 
14 See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 12 (“‘The easiest, most cost effective way . . . to 
shake Christians from their slumber, and have “a teaching moment” that brings them 
back to God’s priorities – is to show images and use words that reflect God’s priorities in 
TV ads. We must show the babies’ mangled remains. And legally, the only way you and I 
are going to do that en masse is through TV commercials we can run as federal 
candidates.’”). 
15 Terry FEC Form 2, Statement of Candidacy, (June 12, 2012), available at 
http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/865/12030821865/12030821865.pdf. Constrained by the 
eligibility requirements for federal elective office enumerated in the U.S. Constitution, 
states may not limit ballots for Representative to those who currently reside in the state. 
See generally U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). Article I, section 2 
states: “No person shall be a Representative . . . who shall not, when elected, be an 
Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.” In order to meet this requirement, a 
person must reside in the state he is representing by Election Day. See CASES OF 
CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS 224–25 (M. Clarke & D. Hall eds., 1834); see also 
Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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tucky, and Nebraska.16 In this way, Terry was able to invoke the 
candidate reasonable access privilege to buy airtime on television 
stations in major media markets in neighboring swing states, so 
long as the stations also broadcast into some portion of the state 
where he was on the ballot. By virtue of being on the ballot in West 
Virginia, for instance, Terry sought to air television ads in portions 
of Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and the District of Co-
lumbia.17 Some of Terry’s allies appear to have chosen the districts 
in which they sought placement on the ballot based on similar au-
dience-targeting considerations.18 The ads aired by the activists, 
too, reflected an interest in expressing the group’s views on abor-
tion, rather than in campaigning for office. The template-style ads, 
each shared by most or all of the activists, typically contained no 
image or mention of the “candidate,” the state in which he or she 
was running, or the office he or she purported to seek, other than in 
the mandatory disclosure at the end of the ad.19 
                                                                                                                            
16 Presidential Candidates on the 2012 General Election Ballots of Each State and the 
District of Columbia, http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/2012presgecands.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2014); Letter from Randall Terry, Exhibit A to Gannett Co., Inc. Petition 
for Reconsideration in FCC Matter DA 12-1734, Nov. 2, 2012 (on file with author). Terry 
avoided being on the ballot for President in “swing states” so as not to attract any voters 
away from Mitt Romney in states where he expected the race between Romney and 
President Obama to be close. Id. Thus, he was very determinedly trying not to win votes 
with his “candidate” ads—his target audience was those in swing states who could see 
his ads but could not vote for him. 
17 Letter from Randall Terry, supra note 16. 
18 For example, David Lewis, a resident of the 2nd Congressional district of Ohio, was 
on the ballot against John Boehner in the 8th district of Ohio for the Republican primary 
and in the 4th Congressional district of Kentucky as an independent for the general 
election, allowing him to purchase airtime on television stations in nearby Cincinnati, 
Ohio and in Louisville, Kentucky. Lewis FEC Form 2, Statement of Candidacy (Feb. 13, 
2012), http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/456/12030741456/12030741456.pdf; Lewis 
Amended FEC Form 2, Statement of Candidacy (Oct. 9, 2012), http://doc
query.fec.gov/pdf/074/12030893074/12030893074.pdf; Lewis WLWT-TV Cincinnati 
Sales Contract (Oct. 25, 2012), https://stations.fcc.gov/collect/files/46979/
Political%20File/2012/Federal/US%20House/KY-04/DAVID%20LEWIS/lewis%2010%
2031%20(13512765087331).pdf ; Lewis WAVE-TV Louisville Sales Contract https://
stations.fcc.gov/collect/files/13989/Political%20File/2012/Federal/US%20House/KY-
04/David%20Lewis/Lewis-Congress%20Oct%2019%20(13505898045067).pdf. 
19 Labash, supra note 1. 
2014] UNREASONABLE ACCESS 123 
Unsurprisingly, numerous broadcast stations resisted airing 
these advertisements.20 Many broadcasters worried that they 
would antagonize viewers by airing graphic ads that some would 
not realize the broadcasters were compelled by law to carry.21 But 
there was a deeper concern here, as well—one that repeatedly sur-
faces in disputes over broadcast regulation. The Supreme Court 
has recognized that broadcasters have broad, constitutionally pro-
tected discretion in making programming decisions.22 On that ba-
sis, broadcasters often have viewed restrictions on the content they 
air or requirements that they air content not of their choosing as 
serious incursions on their editorial freedom. Indeed, broadcasters 
had previously made such arguments in challenging the statutory 
reasonable access right for federal candidates.23 With regard to or-
ders for time placed by Terry and his allies, many broadcasters 
viewed extending reasonable access rights to individuals not seek-
ing office as a significant expansion of this “limited”24 public ser-
vice obligation, and one that had the potential to become a signifi-
cant burden on broadcasters’ editorial discretion. Moreover, due to 
the equal-opportunities rights that candidates have with respect to 
airtime purchased by others in the same race, an increase in the 
                                                                                                                            
20 See, e.g., In re Terry, 27 FCC Rcd. 598, 598 (Feb. 3, 2012); In re Randall Terry for 
President, 27 FCC Rcd. 13418, 13418 (Oct. 31, 2012); Response of WPLG to FCC 
Complaint by Randall Terry, Oct. 26, 2012 (on file with author); WSCV and WTVJ Brief 
in Support of WPLG-TV, Oct. 28, 2012 (on file with author); Response of WFLX (TV) 
to FCC Complaint by Randall Terry, Nov. 15, 2012 (on file with author); see also Press 
Release, Randall Terry, Are Catholic Voters the ‘New Negro’ of the Democratic Party? 
Will FCC Protect Pro-life Catholic Democrats from Political Segregation?, Feb. 2, 2012, 
http://www.christiannewswire.com/news/1846918853.html; Press Release, Terry for 
President Campaign Committee, FCC Rules Washington DC Stations Must Run Graphic 
Abortion Ads of Terry for President, Nov. 1, 2012, http://www.christian
newswire.com/news/5678770786.html. 
21 Telephone Interview with Kurt Wimmer, Partner, Covington & Burling LLP, 
Counsel for Gannett, Co., Inc., in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 2, 2014). 
22 See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (“As a 
general rule, the nature of editorial discretion counsels against subjecting broadcasters to 
claims of viewpoint discrimination.”). 
23 See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding reasonable access as a 
limited incursion on broadcasters’ editorial discretion, justified as an attempt by Congress 
to balance the First Amendment rights of federal candidates, the public, and broadcasters, 
while ensuring that the airwaves are used in the public interest). 
24 Id. at 396. 
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number of pretextual candidates25 could crowd out some speech of 
genuine candidates by decreasing the amount of airtime available to 
the latter group.26 
However, in responding to October 2012 complaints filed by 
Terry and his allies, which alleged that a number of stations had 
violated the political broadcasting rules by refusing them access, 
the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC” or the 
“Commission”) did not address broadcasters’ First Amendment 
arguments regarding the permissible scope of candidate access 
rights. Without appearing to consider the constitutional dimension 
of its decisions, the Commission focused on relatively narrow legal 
issues, unique to the facts of each case, to find that it was unrea-
sonable for the stations to deny access—even where circumstances 
strongly suggested that the purported candidates were not actually 
seeking office and had no intention of becoming legally qualified to 
take office.27 
Arguably displaying discomfort with its role of determining—
or of overseeing broadcasters in determining—which individuals 
                                                                                                                            
25 I use the term “pretextual candidates” throughout this Article to refer to individuals 
who gain ballot access or present themselves as write-in candidates for a federal race in 
order to gain statutory political broadcasting rights, rather than in an attempt to gain 
office, or even to attract votes to themselves. While not all real-world situations are easily 
categorized, the basic distinction between a genuine candidate and a pretextual candidate 
is whether “the ads were made to support the campaign or the campaign was made to 
support the ads.” McConnell & Todd, supra note 11. 
26 In determining how much access is reasonable to afford one candidate, broadcasters 
take into account the number of other candidates in the race who could potentially make 
reasonable access and equal-opportunities claims. See FCC Political Broadcasting Primer, 
100 F.C.C.2d 1476, 1523 (1984). 
27 See Telephone Decision of Robert Baker, Mass Media Bureau Policy Division 
Assistant Chief for Political Broadcasting, Federal Communications Commission, in the 
matter of the informal complaint of Andrew Beacham against station WAVE (Oct. 18, 
2012) (a person on the ballot for Congress in one state who lives in another state is 
considered “qualified under the applicable local, State or Federal law” under 47 C.F.R. 
§ 73.1940 by virtue of being on the ballot, even where he does not currently meet 
constitutional residency requirements to take office and has provided no evidence of or 
assurance of intention to relocate); see also Complaint of Randall Terry for President, 27 
FCC Rcd. 13418 (Oct. 31, 2012) (where Randall Terry was on the ballot in West Virginia 
and the digital Washington, D.C. station refused him access, relying on a terrain-
dependent coverage map to show that it did not broadcast a signal into West Virginia, 
station should instead have used a methodology analogous to that used in determining the 
contour of analog television stations and should have granted access to Terry). 
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are entitled to candidate political broadcasting rights, the Commis-
sion effectively created a bright-line rule requiring broadcasters to 
grant access to any person on the ballot for a federal race in the re-
levant geographic area.28 This prophylactic rule has the benefit of 
preventing broadcasters from refusing to sell time to a candidate 
because they do not like what he has to say or because they perce-
ive that the candidate has little chance of winning.29 However, the 
rule also has the cost of forcing broadcasters, who are normally un-
derstood to exercise broad editorial discretion protected by the 
First Amendment, to air messages from some individuals who do 
not seek to hold office. 
In this Article, I examine whether imposing such a prophylactic 
rule on broadcasters—rather than permitting them to exercise 
judgment, based on neutral factors such as those permitted in the 
context of write-in candidates,30 to determine whether an individu-
                                                                                                                            
28 In an informal decision considering a complaint by Andrew Beacham, an Indiana 
resident who was on the ballot for Congress in Kentucky, FCC political broadcasting staff 
stated that in evaluating whether a person “is qualified under the applicable local, State or 
Federal law to hold the office for which he or she is a candidate” for purposes of FCC 
political broadcasting rules, the Commission’s policy is to defer to a state election 
agency’s decision to place that person’s name on the ballot. See Complaint of Randall 
Terry for President, 27 FCC Rcd. 13418 (Oct. 31, 2012). Beyond the question of whether 
deference to state agencies on questions of federal law is appropriate in this context, the 
Commission’s policy is troubling in at least two respects. First, it appears to assume, 
incorrectly, that the requirements a person must meet for federal ballot access are the 
same as the requirements to actually hold office in the event that one is elected. See supra 
note 15. Second, even with regard to ballot access requirements, state election agencies do 
not typically investigate whether an applicant for federal ballot access actually meets the 
relevant federal requirements. 
29 See Becker v. FCC, 95 F.3d 75, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (striking down FCC policy 
permitting broadcasters to channel a candidate’s graphic anti-abortion ads to times when 
children were less likely to be in the audience because such a policy granted broadcasters 
standard-less discretion that would allow them to discriminate according to an ad’s 
message); Political Broadcasting Primer, supra note 26, at 1486 (broadcast stations may 
not refuse to grant reasonable access because they perceive that the candidate has low 
odds of winning). 
30 In the context of write-in candidates, broadcasters may ask an individual claiming a 
right to reasonable access to make a “substantial showing of bona fide candidacy.” 47 
C.F.R. §§ 73.1940(b)(2), 73.1940(e)(2) (2013). Such a showing includes “evidence that 
the person claiming to be a candidate has engaged to a substantial degree in activities 
commonly associated with political campaigning . . . . includ[ing] making campaign 
speeches, distributing campaign literature, issuing press releases, maintaining a campaign 
committee, and establishing campaign headquarters.” Id. § 73.1940(f). Notably, the single 
2012 Terry decision the FCC made in favor of the broadcaster involved a situation in 
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al is entitled to reasonable access—can be constitutionally justified 
in light of broadcasters’ First Amendment status and the legislative 
purposes of and constitutional justifications for the reasonable 
access statute. This Article is the first to consider this question and 
is also unique in taking an in-depth look at the current state of po-
litical broadcasting law, particularly in light of the changes that 
have taken place in the market for political advertising since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC.31 Although 
much attention is being paid, both in legal academia and in the 
mainstream press, to the money flowing into elections from cam-
paign contributions, very little attention is paid to the legal frame-
work governing the primary way that money is spent—on televi-
sion advertisements. 
Scholars who have written more generally on the intersection 
of broadcast regulation and the First Amendment have frequently 
been unimpressed by the Supreme Court’s justifications—most 
famously the scarcity rationale elaborated in Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v. FCC32—for placing requirements on broadcasters that could 
not normally be placed on other speakers.33 Some, most notably 
Owen Fiss and Cass Sunstein, have proposed an alternative justifi-
cation for extending lesser constitutional protections to broadcas-
ters—the dissemination of information and promotion of public 
debate necessary for democratic decision-making.34 Under their 
theories, the central value of the First Amendment is furtherance 
of the democratic process, and any autonomous speech interests of 
individuals, including broadcasters (and, presumably, other media 
owners who come to play a similarly significant role in democratic 
discourse), are subordinate. 
                                                                                                                            
which he purported to be a write-in candidate but had failed to make a substantial showing 
of bona fide candidacy. In re Terry, 27 FCC Rcd. 598 (Feb. 3, 2012). 
31 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
32 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
33 See, e.g., LEE BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 87–97 (1991); LUCAS POWE, 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 197–215 (1987); CHRISTOPHER 
S. YOO, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 914 
GEO. L.J. 245, 266–306 (2003). 
34 See OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 13–17, 36–38 (1996); CASS SUNSTEIN, 
DEMOCRACY AND FREE SPEECH 18–20 (1995). 
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Others, like Christopher Yoo in recent years, have argued that, 
given the technological convergence of communications media, 
there simply is no longer any adequate justification that would al-
low courts, Congress, and the FCC to treat broadcasters differently 
from other media owners.35 Accordingly, “the First Amendment’s 
traditional respect for individual autonomy and traditional suspi-
cion of government intervention,” requires that the higher stan-
dard of scrutiny applied to regulation of other media be applied to 
broadcasting as well.36 
Still others have argued that our democracy is best served by a 
system in which various portions of the press are afforded differing 
degrees of autonomy under the First Amendment. Lee Bollinger, 
who has been credited with originating this idea,37 has argued that 
while traditional print media should be maintained as an unregu-
lated “benchmark” of the free press, newer electronic media, in-
cluding broadcast radio and television, may serve as a laboratory of 
regulatory experimentation in which democracy-furthering rules, 
such as candidate access requirements, may be tested.38 C. Edwin 
Baker has argued that a complex democracy such as ours requires 
various media to perform different functions, and, consequently, to 
be regulated differently.39 Largely agreeing with Professor Baker, 
Jack Balkin has argued, “free speech values—interactivity, mass 
participation, and the ability to modify and transform culture—
must be protected through technological design and through ad-
ministrative and legislative regulation of technology, as well as 
through the more traditional method of judicial creation and recog-
nition of constitutional rights.”40 
Nonetheless, unlike Professors Fiss and Sunstein, this final 
group of scholars recognizes that regulation of new media must al-
                                                                                                                            
35 See YOO, supra note 33, at 355–56. 
36 Id. 
37 See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 188 (2002). 
38 See BOLLINGER, supra note 33, at 85, 120. 
39 BAKER, supra note 37, at 149, 187–92. According to Professor Baker, in a complex 
democracy, interest groups require media that will help mobilize people and promote 
their divergent interests. But complex democracy also requires “inclusive, nonsegmented 
media entities[] that support a search for general societal agreement on common goods.” 
Id. at 148–49. 
40 Balkin, supra note 4, at 44 n.74. 
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so take into account other First Amendment values, including the 
autonomy interests prized by Professor Yoo. Referring to the FCC 
ban on indecent language, Professor Bollinger urges the Supreme 
Court to end the FCC’s “venture in morals regulation in broad-
casting” because “[i]t is inconsistent with the First Amendment’s 
general commitment to a system of extraordinary protections 
against censorship.”41 Acknowledging, at least implicitly, that me-
dia owners come to the table possessing the same autonomy inter-
ests as other private speakers, Professor Balkin describes broadcast 
regulation as “a quid pro quo, or contractual arrangement, [that] is 
constitutional to the extent that it promotes the values of a demo-
cratic culture.”42 Accordingly, a broadcast regulation should only 
be considered constitutional to the extent that “there is a clear 
nexus between the goals of the regulation and the purposes behind 
the hybrid system”—the comprehensive regulatory scheme that 
has allowed a small number of broadcasters to hold licenses not 
open to all in return for accepting various public service obligations 
and regulations.43 
This Article builds on the theoretical foundations initiated by 
Professors Bollinger, Baker, and Balkin by exploring political 
broadcasting law within the larger context of the constitutional val-
ues underlying our system of broadcast regulation. I demonstrate 
that, from the inception of broadcast regulation, Congress has en-
gaged in a balancing act, seeking not only to ensure that the broad-
cast medium would serve the public interest, but also to protect the 
medium from pervasive government control. Consistently with this 
legislative vision, the Supreme Court has, over the last thirty years, 
recognized that not only the public interest, but also broadcasters’ 
First Amendment speech rights, must be taken into account when 
considering the constitutionality of granting members of the public, 
including candidates for public office, access to broadcast sta-
                                                                                                                            
41 LEE BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN: A FREE PRESS FOR A NEW 
CENTURY 127 (2010). 
42 Balkin, supra note 4, at 44 n.74. 
43 Id. 
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tions.44 Nonetheless, the Court has provided little guidance as to 
how this should be done. 
I argue that because Congress chose to use a system of predo-
minantly private broadcasters to pursue the democratic First 
Amendment values embodied in the Communications Act—and 
because many of the requirements placed on broadcasters would 
normally be understood to violate the First Amendment rights of 
private speakers—courts should insist that the government not 
burden substantially more broadcaster speech than necessary to 
achieve its aims. This is particularly true where there are effective 
and low-cost alternatives to a burdensome policy. 
In Part I, I describe the framework of political broadcasting law 
and regulations and explore the legislative history of reasonable 
access and the constitutional justifications the Court has given for 
upholding the provision against a First Amendment challenge by 
broadcasters. I place the Court’s only ruling on reasonable access, 
CBS, Inc. v. FCC,45 in the context of earlier and later cases consi-
dering the First Amendment status of broadcasters. In examining 
this legislative and judicial history of broadcast regulation, particu-
larly with regard to access rights, I show that tension has always 
existed between serving the First Amendment needs of the public 
and protecting the First Amendment rights of broadcasters. 
In Part II, I contrast the legal treatment of federal candidates 
with that of non-candidate political advertisers, arguing that incen-
tives arising from political broadcasting law and market conditions 
for non-candidate political advertising cause a strategy like Terry’s 
to be increasingly attractive for individuals seeking to broadcast 
their political views. I then discuss the FCC’s 2012 decisions in-
volving Terry and his allies, showing that the FCC’s failure to ad-
dress (and perhaps even fully to perceive the existence of) the First 
Amendment question raised by broadcasters illustrates the uncer-
tainty created by the current state of case law, with regard to how 
competing First Amendment values should be weighed in the area 
of broadcast regulation. 
                                                                                                                            
44 See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 675 (1998); FCC v. 
League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 
367, 394 (1981); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm’n, 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973). 
45 453 U.S. 367 (1981). 
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In Part III, I observe that, in light of the history and purposes of 
broadcast regulation, as well as the development of case law since 
Red Lion,46 a conception of broadcasters as trustees subject to ex-
tensive government regulation in furtherance of the public interest 
is far too simplistic. I argue that, under a better understanding of 
broadcast regulation, Congress has structured its regulatory 
scheme so as to incentivize broadcasters to produce coherent, ba-
lanced, and informative programming—content that is valuable to 
a democratic conception of the First Amendment and that is likely 
to be underproduced by the market. However, because Congress 
has chosen to use private speakers to carry out the essential tasks of 
informing the public and fostering public discussion and, indeed, 
because freedom from government control is necessary to these 
tasks, the First Amendment requires that the FCC maintain a close 
fit between the legislative ends it is tasked with furthering and the 
means it chooses for doing so. 
Finally, I return to the FCC’s policy in its October 2012 deci-
sions, considering the potential the prophylactic rule has both to 
interfere with broadcasters’ editorial freedom and also to reduce 
the opportunities for genuine candidates to speak directly to the 
public through the broadcast medium. In particular, because 
broadcasters must take into account the number of federal candi-
dates who are eligible for reasonable access when deciding how 
much time to make available to each candidate, the Commission’s 
requirement that broadcasters grant access to all candidates on the 
ballot, including pretextual ones, has significant potential to lead to 
the crowding out of genuine candidates’ speech. I suggest an alter-
native policy—similar to that already in place in the context of 
write-in candidates—that would better achieve the legislative pur-
poses of reasonable access and would burden less broadcaster and 
candidate speech activity. Under my approach, the Commission 
would permit broadcasters to evaluate evidence of campaigning 
activities in order to determine whether an individual on the ballot 
is a “bona fide candidate” entitled to reasonable access. This ap-
proach would help limit candidate political broadcasting privileges 
to those seeking to gain public office, rather than extending them to 
                                                                                                                            
46 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
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those who are simply seeking to gain access to a particularly effec-
tive platform. 
I. CANDIDATE POLITICAL BROADCASTING RIGHTS 
In this Part, I describe the framework of political broadcasting 
law and regulations applying to candidate advertisers, highlighting 
the tension between furthering public-oriented First Amendment 
values and protecting broadcasters’ free speech rights that has ex-
isted throughout the history of broadcast regulation. I first explore 
the history and purposes of statutory political broadcasting rights, 
including reasonable access and the closely related equal opportun-
ities and lowest unit rate provisions. I then discuss the FCC’s im-
plementation of these laws through its rules and guidance. Finally, 
I explore the constitutional rationale for reasonable access given by 
the Supreme Court in CBS, Inc. v. FCC,47 examining that case in 
the context of previous cases considering the constitutionality of 
access rights to broadcast stations and in light of subsequent devel-
opments. 
A. History and Purposes of Statutory Political Broadcasting Rights 
During the technological infancy of radio communication, the 
Radio Act of 1912 was passed to coordinate point-to-point commu-
nication, the emergence of broadcasting radio signals to large au-
diences having not yet been anticipated.48 By the 1920s, however, a 
radio broadcasting industry of private station owners had begun to 
emerge, following the failed attempt by the Secretary of the Navy 
to have the industry nationalized and controlled by the govern-
ment.49 Although dominated in some respects by large corpora-
tions holding patents to radio technologies,50 the creation of broad-
cast stations quickly proliferated among a variety of non-profit and 
                                                                                                                            
47 453 U.S. 367 (1981). 
48 See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND 
DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928–1935 13 
(1993). 
49 Id. at 12–14. 
50 These corporations were not the broadcast networks we are familiar with today, but 
instead included such manufacturing and telecommunications companies as RCA, 
General Electric, AT&T, and Westinghouse. Id. 
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commercial organizations seeking to spread their messages to the 
public, including religious groups, labor unions, civic organizations, 
and colleges and universities, as well as newspapers, department 
stores, power companies, and automobile dealerships.51 In the ab-
sence of broadcast regulation,52 the situation became chaotic, due 
to widespread interference between broadcast signals.53 In addi-
tion, the economic instability of the broadcast industry—resulting 
from station owners’ reliance on funds from their primary enter-
prises to support their stations, rather than on self-sufficient reve-
nue models such as selling advertising—combined with the prob-
lem of signal interference to prevent the public from having reliably 
available sources of information on the airwaves.54 
Faced with this chaos, Congress passed “emergency legisla-
tion” establishing the statutory framework of the broadcast system 
we have today, in the Radio Act of 1927.55 The Federal Radio 
Commission (“FRC”), the predecessor to the FCC, was estab-
lished on an interim basis to assign broadcast licenses and to bring 
order to the air, a task that was widely considered to require reduc-
ing the total number of broadcasters.56 Without providing specific 
guidelines for the FRC to use in distributing broadcast licenses, the 
Radio Act of 1927 “called for the FRC to allocate licenses on the 
basis of which prospective broadcaster best served the ‘public in-
terest, convenience, or necessity,’ a phrase adopted from public 
utilities law.”57 
                                                                                                                            
51 Id. at 14; see also R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 4 (1959) (“On March 1, 1922, there were 60 broadcasting stations in the United 
States. By November 1, the number was 564.”). 
52 Herbert Hoover, as Secretary of Commerce, had developed an early broadcast 
licensing scheme. However, he discontinued all broadcast regulation after a court held 
that the Radio Act of 1912 had not given the Department of Commerce power to place 
additional criteria on radio licenses. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 48 at 16–17; see also 
United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 617 (N.D. Ill. 1926). 
53 MCCHESNEY, supra note 48, at 16–18; see also Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic 
Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 104 (1973); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375–76 
(1969). 
54 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 48, at 14–15. 
55 Id. at 16–18. 
56 Id. at 17–18. 
57 Id. at 18. 
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1. Equal Opportunities for Candidates for Elective Office 
In many respects, precisely how the FRC, and subsequently the 
FCC, should regulate broadcasters in the “public interest, conven-
ience, or necessity,” was unclear in the early days of broadcast-
ing.58 Nonetheless, Congress clearly “chose to leave broad journa-
listic discretion with the licensee,”59 rejecting both government 
control of the content aired on the broadcast medium and treat-
ment of broadcasters as common carriers obligated to carry the 
speech of others on a nonselective basis.60 Although an early ver-
sion of the bill that became the Radio Act of 1927 would explicitly 
have deemed broadcasters to be common carriers for the purpose 
of “‘discussion of any question affecting the public,’” Congress 
ultimately adopted an amended version of the bill that eliminated 
the common carrier obligation.61 Senator Dill, the principal archi-
tect of the Radio Act of 1927, introduced this amendment, stating, 
“[‘public questions’] is such a general term that there is probably 
no question of any interest whatsoever that could be discussed but 
that the other side of it could demand time.”62 
But Senator Dill’s amendment did leave in place a single excep-
tion to the general stance taken by Congress that broadcasters 
should not be required to provide access to members of the pub-
lic—in the event that any candidate for public office was permitted 
to use a broadcasting station to transmit a message, any other can-
didate for the same office was to be afforded equal opportunities to 
                                                                                                                            
58 See id. at 18; see also CHARLES H. TILLINGHAST, AMERICAN BROADCAST REGULATION 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 51–53 (2000). 
59 Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105 (1973). 
60 Id. at 104–11 (discussing the legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927 and the 
Communications Act of 1934 with regard to the statute’s treatment of access rights for 
candidates and for discussion of public issues). 
61 Id. at 105–06 (quoting 67 CONG. REC. 12503 (1926)). 
62 Id. at 106–07 (quoting 67 CONG. REC. 12504 (1926)). In hearings leading up to the 
enactment of the Communications Act of 1934—the statute replacing the “emergency 
legislation” of the Radio Act of 1927—Congress again rejected a proposal that would 
have imposed an access obligation on broadcasters for members of the public wishing to 
discuss public issues. Congress instead enacted provisions specifically providing that “a 
person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not . . . be deemed a common carrier,” and 
that the FCC may not exercise “the power of censorship” over broadcast stations or 
regulate broadcasters so as to “interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio 
communication.” Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(h), 326 (2012). 
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use that broadcasting station.63 Furthermore, broadcasters were 
prohibited from censoring any material broadcast by a candidate 
exercising his equal opportunities right.64 The legislative choice to 
include this equal opportunities provision, while rejecting a similar 
provision for the discussion of public issues, reflects the 
“tightrope” approach to broadcast regulation that continues to this 
day.65 
Although concerned with the evils of both government censor-
ship of broadcast and “private censorship” by broadcasters of 
members of the public, Congress ultimately concluded that gov-
ernment censorship would be “the most pervasive, the most self-
serving, the most difficult to restrain and hence the one most to be 
avoided.”66 Nonetheless, recognizing the importance of allowing 
candidates for public office the opportunity to engage with the elec-
torate in “full and unrestricted discussion of political issues,” 
Congress chose to ensure that broadcasters who make their facili-
ties available to candidates do so on a nondiscriminatory basis.67 
2. Reasonable Access and Lowest Unit Rate 
To this day, candidates for public office remain the only mem-
bers of the public who possess affirmative statutory rights to have 
their voices heard on broadcast stations.68 And in addition to the 
“equal opportunities” rights candidates have possessed from the 
earliest days of broadcast regulation, Congress has since granted to 
candidates two other political broadcasting rights, “lowest unit 
rate” and “reasonable access.”69 With the express intent of “in-
creas[ing] a candidate’s accessibility to the media and to reduc[ing] 
the level of spending for its use,” Congress enacted the reasonable 
                                                                                                                            
63 Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162, § 18 (1927). 
64 Id. 
65 See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 104–05 (1973). 
66 Id. at 105. 
67 Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 529 (1959). 
68 See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2012). 
69 Id. §§ 312(a)(7), 315(b). Note that while equal opportunities and lowest unit rate are 
available to federal, state, and local candidates, reasonable access is available only to 
federal candidates. 
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access and lowest unit rate provisions as part of the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”).70 
Aimed at reducing candidate spending, the “lowest unit rate” 
provision provides that, during the forty-five days prior to a prima-
ry election or the sixty days prior to a general election, state, local, 
and federal legally qualified candidates are entitled to pay broadcast 
stations a rate equal to the lowest rate paid by any other advertiser 
for a purchase of comparable time.71 As I discuss below in Part II, in 
practice, the financial benefit of this provision to candidates is sig-
nificant. 
Reflecting a legislative desire to “give candidates for public of-
fice greater access to the media so that they [could] better explain 
their stand on the issues, and thereby more fully and completely 
inform the voters,”72 the “reasonable access” provision states that 
the FCC may revoke a commercial broadcaster’s license for its 
“willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to per-
mit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broad-
casting station  . . . by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elec-
tive office on behalf of his candidacy.”73 Prior to the enactment of 
reasonable access, it was understood that broadcast stations had a 
general duty, as part of their obligation to serve the public interest, 
                                                                                                                            
70 Hearings on S.1, S. 382, and S.956 before the Subcommittee on Communications of 
the Senate Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1971) (remarks of Sen. 
Pastore); see also 118 CONG. REC. 325 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Devine). 
71 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012). In determining the appropriate reference for calculating 
the rate to be paid by a legally qualified candidate, a broadcaster looks to the length of the 
spot, the time period in which the ad runs (in the broadcasting industry, this is referred to 
as the “daypart”), and the class of time. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, 
POLITICAL BROADCAST CATECHISM 38–39 (17th ed. 2011). For example, two ads running 
in the same commercial break, at 8:01 p.m. and 8:02 p.m., may not be considered to be in 
the same “daypart” if one purchase order was for an ad to run between 8:00 p.m. and 
9:00 p.m. on Thursday night and the other was for an ad to run during primetime on any 
weeknight the broadcaster chooses. “Class of time” most commonly refers to the 
“preemptibility” of an ad. For example, an advertiser may pay a premium to place an ad 
that cannot be preempted by any other advertisements. Another may choose a less 
expensive class of time that can be preempted with 48 hours’ notice. 
72 S. REP. NO. 92–96, at 20 (1971). 
73 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2012). The statute does not define “legally qualified federal 
candidate” or “reasonable amounts of time.” 
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to provide viewers with coverage of political races.74 But candidates 
possessed no affirmative right to access broadcast stations. They 
possessed only a responsive right to access that could be invoked in 
the event that a broadcast station had chosen to grant access to an 
opposing candidate. Now, since the enactment of the reasonable 
access provision, legally qualified federal candidates have a statuto-
ry right to purchase a “reasonable” amount of time on broadcast 
stations, regardless of whether the station has previously provided 
such time to another candidate. 
Nonetheless, like the enactment of the equal opportunities pro-
vision of the Radio Act of 1927, the passage of the “reasonable 
access” provision in 1971 reflects a legislative attempt to balance 
the information needs of the public with the free speech rights of 
broadcasters.75 Congress foresaw the substantial impact this new 
requirement would have on broadcasters and, for that reason, li-
mited the reasonable access provision to candidates seeking federal 
elective office.76 Congress also chose to leave a significant amount 
of discretion with broadcasters regarding what type of program-
ming access should be afforded to candidates. For example, legisla-
tors dropped a provision that would have required broadcasters to 
give candidates “maximum flexibility to choose their program for-
mat.”77 The precise contours of the reasonable access right, how-
ever, including the degree and type of discretion to be retained by 
broadcasters in considering candidates’ reasonable access requests, 
have been shaped by its regulatory implementation by the FCC. 
B. Regulatory Implementation of Reasonable Access 
Upon enactment of the statutory reasonable access provision, 
the FCC immediately recognized that Congress had not simply co-
dified the Commission’s existing policy of taking into consideration 
                                                                                                                            
74 CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 378 (1981) (citing Comm’n Policy in Enforcing 
Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1087–88 (1978) 
[hereinafer Comm’n Policy]). 
75 See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 331 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Mahon) (discussing impact of 
proposed legislation on broadcasting industry); 118 CONG. REC. 331-32 (1972) (remarks of 
Sen. Hillis) (expressing concern that overregulation of broadcast would deal “a heavy 
blow to a free press and, most importantly, to a free society”). 
76 CBS, 453 U.S. at 380–81. 
77 118 CONG. REC. 325 (1972). 
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a broadcaster’s political programming in evaluating whether the 
broadcaster was meeting its public service obligations.78 In re-
sponse, the Commission promulgated rules implementing the pro-
vision and defining certain terms used in the statute. In language 
identical to the statute, the relevant rule states that the Commis-
sion may revoke a broadcast license “for willful or repeated failure 
to allow reasonable access to, or to permit purchase of, reasonable 
amounts of time for use of a broadcasting station by a legally quali-
fied candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candida-
cy.”79 
Under FCC rules, a “legally qualified candidate for public of-
fice” is any person who: (1) “[h]as publicly announced his or her 
intention to run for nomination or office”; (2) “[i]s qualified under 
the applicable local, State or Federal law to hold the office for 
which he or she is a candidate”; and (3) has either, (a) “qualified 
for a place on the ballot,” or (b) “publicly committed himself or 
herself to seeking election by the write-in method and is eligible 
under applicable law [to do so]  . . . and makes a substantial show-
ing that he or she is a bona fide candidate for nomination or of-
fice.”80 In later guidance and decisions, however, the Commission 
effectively has collapsed these requirements into a single test, 
where a person is on the ballot for a federal office. Filing the neces-
sary papers to obtain a place on the ballot “is considered to be the 
equivalent of a public announcement of candidacy,”81 and—as the 
Commission made clear in 2012 when considering the reasonable 
access rights of Terry ally Andrew Beacham—a person on the bal-
lot is irrebuttably presumed to be qualified under the applicable 
federal, state, or local law to hold the office for which he is a candi-
date.82 Thus, broadcasters may make no further inquiries into an 
                                                                                                                            
78 Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 34 
F.C.C.2d 510, 537–38 (1972); see also Comm’n Policy, supra note 74, at 1088. 
79 47 C.F.R. § 73.1944 (2013). 
80 Id. § 73.1940. 
81 FCC Political Broadcasting Primer, supra note 26, at 1480. 
82 In determining, for purposes of FCC rules, whether Beacham was legally qualified to 
hold the office of U.S. Representative from the state of Kentucky, the Commission 
deferred to the Kentucky election board’s decision to place Beacham on the ballot. As a 
practical matter, Beacham, an Indiana resident, did not meet the constitutional 
requirement to represent Kentucky in office, and he had provided no evidence that he 
would become qualified by Election Day—nor had he even stated an intention to relocate. 
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individual’s status as a legally qualified federal candidate once it 
has been demonstrated that he or she is on the ballot. By contrast, 
broadcasters may ask a person claiming to be a write-in candidate 
to make a substantial showing of bona fide candidacy by demon-
strating that she has “engaged to a substantial degree in activities 
commonly associated with political campaigning.”83 Such activities 
typically include “making campaign speeches, distributing cam-
paign literature, issuing press releases, maintaining a campaign 
committee, and establishing a campaign headquarters.”84 
Once a federal candidate’s right to reasonable access has been 
established, a broadcaster must determine whether that candi-
date’s request to buy time is reasonable. A broadcaster may take 
into account its “broader programming and business commit-
ments, including the multiplicity of candidates in a particular race, 
the program disruption that [would] be caused by political advertis-
ing, and the amount of time already sold to a candidate in a particu-
lar race.”85 A broadcaster may not consider such factors as whether 
a candidate is perceived to have a realistic chance of winning,86 or 
the content of the candidate’s campaign advertisement.87 Candi-
dates must be allowed to purchase time once their race is “in full 
swing,” which includes at least the window during which candi-
dates’ lowest unit rate rights are active, but which a broadcaster 
                                                                                                                            
Telephone Decision of Robert Baker, supra note 27. But cf. Complaint Under Section 315 
(Lar Daly), 40 F.C.C. 270 (1956) (where candidate on ballot for race had notified state 
officials that he was withdrawing and evidence indicated that he was supporting another 
candidate for that office and seeking nomination for a different office, he had not made a 
clear showing that he was a legally qualified candidate for the first race); Complaint 
Under Section 315 (Am. Vegetarian Party), 40 F.C.C. 278, 278 (1956) (“[W]here initial 
doubt is present as to whether in fact a candidate is actually legally qualified for the office 
he seeks, then it is incumbent upon that candidate to prove his qualifications.”); Socialist 
Worker Party, 39 F.C.C.2d 89 (1972) (where purported candidates did not meet 
constitutional minimum age requirements for holding the offices of President and Vice 
President, they could not be considered to be legally qualified candidates for those 
offices); Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm., 74 F.C.C.2d 631, 641 (1979) (“[W]e read 
the ‘legally qualified’ language as having an implicit temporal reference to the date(s) of 
requested access.”). 
83 47 C.F.R. § 73.1940(f) (2013). 
84 Id. 
85 Codification of the Comm’n’s Political Programming Policies, 7 FCC Rcd. 678, 681 
(1991). 
86 FCC Political Broadcasting Primer, supra note 26, at 1486. 
87 Becker v. FCC, 95 F.3d 75, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
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may determine has occurred earlier.88 The Commission relies on 
“the reasonable, good faith judgments of [broadcasters] as to what 
constitutes reasonable access under all of the circumstances 
present in particular cases.”89 
C. Court Consideration of the Constitutionality of Reasonable Access 
1. CBS, Inc. v. FCC and Its Precursors 
In the 1981 case CBS, Inc. v. FCC, broadcast networks NBC, 
CBS, and ABC challenged the constitutionality of the reasonable 
access statute, as implemented by the FCC, arguing that the provi-
sion “violate[d] the First Amendment rights of broadcasters by 
unduly circumscribing their editorial discretion.”90 At issue in the 
case was a request by the Carter–Mondale Presidential Committee 
(the “Committee”) to purchase time for a thirty-minute program 
during primetime once during a four-day period in December 
1979.91 The Committee intended to present a documentary outlin-
ing the record of the Carter administration, in conjunction with 
President Carter’s formal announcement of candidacy.92 All three 
networks declined to make the requested time available. CBS, em-
phasizing the potential disruption of regular programming, instead 
offered to sell the Committee two five-minute spots at other times 
of day, just after the requested four-day period.93 NBC and ABC 
replied that they were not yet prepared to sell any time for the 1980 
Presidential campaign as early as December 1979.94 The Commit-
tee then filed a complaint with the FCC, charging that the net-
works had violated their obligation to provide “reasonable access” 
to President Carter.95 In a 4–3 vote, the Commission concluded 
that the reasons provided by the networks did not meet its standard 
                                                                                                                            
88 Comm’n Policy, supra note 74, at 1091. 
89 Codification of the Comm’n’s Political Programming Policies, 7 FCC Rcd. 678, 681 
(1991). 
90 CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981). 
91 Id. at 371. 
92 Id. at 371–72. 
93 Id. at 372. 
94 Id. at 372–73. 
95 Complaint of Carter–Mondale Presidential Comm., 74 F.C.C.2d 631 (1979). 
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of reasonableness because the networks had not adequately consi-
dered all of the relevant factors in denying access.96 
In reviewing the Commission’s decision, the Supreme Court 
upheld reasonable access as a constitutionally permissible “effort 
by Congress to assure that an important resource—the airwaves—
will be used in the public interest” and found that the Commission 
had “properly balance[d] the First Amendment rights of federal 
candidates, the public, and broadcasters.”97 Nonetheless, the fact 
that the Court recognized that broadcasters possessed such First 
Amendment rights to be balanced against others’ was a significant 
development. Eleven years earlier, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC, the Court had stated: 
A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has 
no constitutional right to be the one who holds the 
license or to monopolize a  . . . frequency to the ex-
clusion of his fellow citizens. . . . It is the right of the 
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcas-
ters which is paramount. . . . It is the right of the 
public to receive suitable access to social, political, 
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experience 
which is crucial here. 98 
As Robert Post describes, Red Lion “conceptualized broadcas-
ters as public trustees, rather than as independent and private par-
ticipants in public discourse.”99 
Just four years after Red Lion, however, in the 1973 case CBS, 
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, the Court began to back 
away from the position that broadcasters did not retain indepen-
                                                                                                                            
96 The Commission found that, while the broadcaster retains discretion in evaluating 
what constitutes reasonable access under all of the circumstances present in particular 
cases, reasonable access requires that a candidate’s individualized needs be considered. 
Id. at 642–43. Absent unusual circumstances, federal candidates should not be excluded 
from buying time during primetime. Id. In addition, the Commission found that 
broadcasters had not adequately taken into account evidence that the 1980 presidential 
campaign was already “in full swing.” The networks had instead simply looked to the 
date of the Democratic National Convention, eight months away, in determining that 
President Carter’s reasonable access rights could not yet be invoked. Id. at 645–47. 
97 CBS, 453 U.S. at 397. 
98 395 U.S. 367, 389–90 (1969). 
99 Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 152, 159 (1996). 
2014] UNREASONABLE ACCESS 141 
dent speech rights, recognizing that Congress had permitted pri-
vate broadcasting to develop with “the widest journalistic freedom 
consistent with its public obligations.”100 Although still classifying 
broadcasters as “public trustees,” the Court crafted an interme-
diate position for broadcasters, “envision[ing] an ‘essentially pri-
vate broadcast journalism held only broadly accountable to public 
interest standards.’”101 
When the Court considered the constitutionality of reasonable 
access in CBS, Inc. v. FCC in 1981, the Court explicitly recognized 
for the first time that broadcasters’ free speech rights stemmed not 
just from the Communications Act, but from the First Amendment 
itself.102 The Court thus signified that broadcasters would be 
treated, at least in some respects, “as participants in public dis-
course, with attendant constitutional protections.”103 In upholding 
the Commission’s application of reasonable access to the broadcast 
networks, the Court emphasized the narrowness of the incursion 
on broadcasters’ free speech and the discretion retained by broad-
casters in determining when and how their obligations should be 
fulfilled: 
Section 312(a)(7) creates a limited right to “reason-
able” access that pertains only to legally qualified 
federal candidates and may be invoked by them only 
for the purpose of advancing their candidacies once 
a campaign has commenced. The Commission has 
stated that, in enforcing the statute, it will ‘provide 
leeway to broadcasters and not merely attempt de 
novo to determine the reasonableness of their judg-
ments.’ If broadcasters have considered the relevant 
factors in good faith, the Commission will uphold 
their decisions.104 
                                                                                                                            
100 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973). 
101 Post, supra note 99, at 159–60 (quoting CBS, 453 U.S. at 120). 
102 CBS, 453 U.S. at 370. Whereas in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic 
National Committee the Court had referred to broadcasters’ journalistic freedom as 
guaranteed by statute, in CBS, the Court explicitly recognized that broadcasters retained 
First Amendment speech rights. 
103 Post, supra note 99, at 160. 
104 CBS, 453 U.S. at 396. 
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The Court also carefully examined the constitutional interests 
served by reasonable access, stating, “The First Amendment ‘has 
its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of 
campaigns for political office.’”105 The Court recognized that “‘it 
is of particular importance that candidates have the . . . opportunity 
to make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently 
evaluate the candidates’ personal qualities and their positions on 
vital public issues before choosing among them on election 
day.’”106 Thus, the Court found that reasonable access “makes a 
significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the 
ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, informa-
tion necessary for the effective operation of the democratic 
process.”107 
2. Developments Since CBS, Inc. v. FCC 
After CBS, Inc. v. FCC, it became clear that, although the 
Court was not prepared to abandon the long-standing view that 
broadcasters could be regulated in the public interest—especially 
where Congress seeks to further First Amendment values—any 
regulation requiring broadcasters to grant access to members of the 
public would need to survive some form of constitutional scrutiny 
more exacting than the deferential standard employed in Red Lion. 
Three years later, in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 
the Court reinforced the idea that the First Amendment limits the 
scope of permissible broadcast regulation.108 According to the 
Court, because “broadcasters are engaged in a vital and indepen-
dent form of communicative activity  . . . the First Amendment 
must inform and give shape to the manner in which Congress exer-
cises its regulatory power.”109 Although recognizing that “the 
broadcasting industry plainly operates under restraints not imposed 
upon other media,” the Court observed, “the thrust of these re-
                                                                                                                            
105 Id. (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). 
106 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52–53 (1976)). 
107 Id. 
108 See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (striking 
down a statutory provision forbidding any noncommercial educational broadcasting 
station receiving a grant from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting from engaging in 
editorializing). 
109 Id. at 377. 
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strictions has generally been to secure the public’s First Amend-
ment interest in receiving a balanced presentation of views on di-
verse matters of public concern.”110 Citing its prior decisions in 
Columbia Broadcasting Stystem, Inc. v. DNC, CBS, Inc. v. FCC, and, 
perhaps surprisingly, Red Lion, the Court noted in League of Women 
Voters that restrictions on broadcast programming had been upheld 
only where “narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmen-
tal interest.”111 
Then in 1998, in Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. 
Forbes, the Court recognized that requiring broadcasters to grant 
access to outside speakers—even political candidates—carries the 
potential of interfering with broadcasters’ own speech activities.112 
The Court rejected a candidate’s claim that his exclusion from a 
debate held by a public television station violated his First 
Amendment rights. In doing so, the Court stated, “In the case of 
television broadcasting  . . . broad rights of access for outside 
speakers would be antithetical, as a general rule, to the discretion 
that stations and their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill their 
journalistic purpose and statutory obligations.” 113 
                                                                                                                            
110 Id. at 380. 
111 Id. at 380–81. While the intermediate scrutiny test from League of Women Voters has 
not disappeared from use, the contexts in which courts invoke it are unpredictable. See, 
e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 464 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying 
League of Women Voters intermediate scrutiny test to evaluate constitutionality of 
restriction on indecent speech), rev’d on other grounds, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 
Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009); Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239, 244–45 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(rejecting both the League of Women Voters intermediate scrutiny test and the minimal 
scrutiny test from FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 
(1978), choosing instead a “more than minimal rationality” standard for evaluation of the 
newspaper-broadcast station cross-ownership rule); Sinclair Broad. Grp., Inc. v. FCC, 
284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (applying rational-basis review to local ownership rule 
because no class of broadcasters had been singled out); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 
U.S. 547, 567–69 (1990) (applying intermediate scrutiny test from League of Women Voters 
to evaluate constitutionality of minority ownership preferences), overruled on other grounds 
by Adarand Constructors., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). This test typically has not 
been used in the very limited number of cases brought to challenge access rights since 
1984. See, e.g., Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37, 49–50 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying unclear 
lower standard of scrutiny in rejecting argument of news reporter, who was also a 
candidate, that the statutory equal-opportunities provision violated his First Amendment 
rights and those of the broadcast station that employed him). 
112 Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1996). 
113 Id. at 673. 
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The Forbes Court’s reasoning underscores the significance of 
the Court’s emphasis in CBS, Inc. v. FCC on the limited nature of 
broadcasters’ reasonable access obligations and the discretion they 
exercise in fulfilling those obligations. Because “broadcasters  . . . 
are not only permitted, but indeed required, to exercise substantial 
editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of their pro-
gramming,” claims of access by outside speakers could interfere 
with broadcasters’ constitutionally protected speech activity.114 
Although recognizing that some broadcasters might abuse their 
power in choosing among speakers, the Forbes Court noted that 
“‘[c]alculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher 
values.’”115 Broad claims of access could result in “transferring 
‘control over the treatment of public issues from the licensees who 
are accountable for broadcast performance to private individu-
als.’”116 And while “[d]eliberation on the positions and qualifica-
tions of candidates is integral to our system of government,” the 
Forbes Court found that, “[o]n logistical grounds alone, a  . . . tele-
vision editor might, with reason, decide that inclusion of all ballot-
qualified candidates would ‘actually undermine the educational 
value and quality of debates.’”117 In the context of federal candi-
dates’ reasonable access rights, then, it remains to be seen precise-
ly how broadly the Commission may constitutionally construe 
broadcasters’ obligation to provide access to legally qualified feder-
al candidates. 
                                                                                                                            
114 Id. at 673–74 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 
U.S. 94, 125 (1973) (“When a . . . broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the 
selection and presentation of its programming, it engages in speech activity.”)). 
115 Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673–74 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., 412 U.S. at 124). 
116 Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674–75 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., 412 U.S. at 124). 
117 Forbes, 523 U.S. at 676, 681. The Court was careful to note that, while it was 
disinclined to use its existing public forum doctrine to require public television stations to 
include all candidates in debates, it was not holding that “the First Amendment would bar 
the legislative imposition of neutral rules for access to public television stations.” Id. at 
675. Rather, the Court found that “in most cases, the First Amendment of its own force 
does not compel public broadcasters to allow third parties access to their programming.” 
Id. 
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II. GAMING THE SYSTEM—PRETEXTUAL CANDIDATES 
In this Part, I demonstrate that incentives arising from the dis-
tinct treatment of candidate and non-candidate advertisers under 
political broadcasting law, combined with recent market conditions 
for non-candidate political advertising, cause a strategy like Randall 
Terry’s to be increasingly attractive for individuals seeking to 
broadcast their political views. I then discuss the FCC’s 2012 deci-
sions involving Terry and his allies, showing that the FCC’s failure 
to address (and perhaps even to perceive) the First Amendment 
question raised by broadcasters illustrates the uncertainty created 
by the current state of case law. 
A. Incentives to Game the System 
As discussed above, candidates for public office receive certain 
benefits with regard to broadcasting—reasonable access, lowest 
unit rate, and equal opportunities (including the no censorship por-
tion of that provision)—that are not enjoyed by other members of 
the public. These benefits become all the more attractive when 
considering the comparative disadvantage of non-candidate politi-
cal advertisers—those members of the public purchasing time on 
broadcast stations to air messages on issues of public importance 
or, more frequently as of late, to weigh in on the candidates in an 
upcoming election. 
Unlike the preferred status enjoyed by candidate advertisers, 
non-candidate political advertisers enjoy no legal right of access, 
either affirmative or responsive, to broadcast stations.118 As de-
scribed above in Part I.A, prior to enactment of the Radio Act of 
1927, Congress considered and rejected a version of the bill that 
included an equal-opportunities right for the discussion of public 
issues. While for many years the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine func-
tioned similarly to the way the failed legislative provision would 
have,119 requiring broadcasters to provide an opportunity for the 
                                                                                                                            
118 See Codification of the Comm’n’s Political Programming Policies, 7 FCC Rcd. 678, 
685, n.54 (1991). 
119 This doctrine was upheld against First Amendment challenge in Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
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presentation of conflicting views on issues of public importance, 
the doctrine was eliminated nearly thirty years ago.120 
Also in marked contrast to the statutory protection enjoyed by 
candidate advertisers,121 when broadcasters do choose to sell time 
to non-candidate political advertisers, they may refuse to air par-
ticular messages or request modifications to the content of the ads. 
In practice, this happens for a variety of reasons. Broadcasters are 
sometimes concerned that a certain ad may misinform viewers or 
antagonize viewers or other advertisers and, occasionally, may 
refuse to air an ad failing to reflect any coherent message at all.122 
In addition, broadcasters are wary of incurring legal liability arising 
from the content of non-candidate political advertisements. During 
election season, broadcasters receive a constant flow of cease and 
desist letters from candidates claiming to have been defamed by 
ads sponsored by political action committees and other non-
candidate advertisers.123 Other legal concerns raised in non-
candidate political advertisements include potential trademark and 
copyright infringement and violation of FCC and Federal Election 
Commission sponsorship disclosure requirements. 
And while candidate advertisers receive the benefit of lowest 
unit rate for ads airing during the pre-election window, guarantee-
ing them a rate equivalent to, if not lower than, the lowest rate paid 
by any commercial advertiser for a comparable spot,124 non-
                                                                                                                            
120 See Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043 (Aug. 6, 1987). The 
Commission found that the doctrine chilled speech on controversial issues by 
“provid[ing] broadcasters with a powerful incentive not to air controversial issue 
programming” above the minimal amount required to meet its regulatory obligations. Id. 
at 5049. The Fairness Doctrine was formally removed from the FCC’s rules in 2011. 
Press Release, FCC, FCC Chairman Genachowski Continues Regulatory Reform to Ease 
Burden on Businesses; Announces Elimination of 83 Outdated Rules (Aug. 22, 2011), 
available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/genachowski-announces-elimination-83-
outdated-media-rules. 
121 See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2012). Although the no-censorship provision in political 
broadcasting law is part of Section 315’s grant of equal-opportunities rights, FCC 
precedent supports the idea that censorship of candidate messages will not be tolerated 
even where only Section 312(a)(7) reasonable access rights are invoked. See Lili Levi, The 
FCC, Indecency, and Anti-Abortion Political Advertising, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 85, 136 
(1996). 
122 Telephone Interview with Kurt Wimmer, supra note 21. 
123 Id. 
124 See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2012). 
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candidate political advertisers often pay rates higher than most 
commercial advertisers. This price difference is often substantial, 
for several reasons. 
First, the cost of buying time tends to go up as the airdate nears 
and inventory decreases. This cost increase is often dramatic dur-
ing the weeks leading up to federal elections, as inventory becomes 
extremely scarce.125 Candidates placing last minute orders for time 
get the benefit of the price that commercial advertisers, who tend 
to book much further in advance, paid months earlier for ads airing 
the same day. Non-candidate advertisers, by contrast, must pay 
whatever the going rate is at the time they place their orders. 
Second, in determining lowest unit rate, broadcasters must give 
candidates the benefit of the package rates that long-term commer-
cial advertisers have paid for comparable spots.126 For example, a 
frequent commercial advertiser who agrees to buy twenty spots 
might pay only $150 for a spot that would normally cost $200. A 
candidate paying lowest unit rate for the purchase of a comparable 
spot would pay only $150, without having to purchase a package. 
Non-candidate advertisers who do not wish to buy an entire pack-
age of time will not receive this discount. 
Finally, broadcasters often create a special rate class for non-
candidate political advertisers, higher than the rate charged even 
commercial advertisers.127 These rates reflect the higher costs as-
sociated with running non-candidate political advertisers, including 
legal fees for attorney review of ads. 
In light of the benefits received by candidate advertisers, it is 
clear why a person wishing to air a political advertisement might 
prefer to be considered a legally qualified candidate. Broadcasters 
are required to air a candidate’s message, whatever it is and how-
ever it is presented, charging below-market rates for doing so. Yet, 
this has been true since 1971, and non-candidate political advertis-
                                                                                                                            
125 See Katy Bachman, Political TV Ads Shatter Records, ADWEEK, Oct. 24, 2012, 
http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/political-tv-ads-shatter-records-
144746 (“‘Some advertisers are paying five times what advertisers would normally pay to 
get on the air.’”). 
126 For a detailed explanation of this point, see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
BROADCASTERS, POLITICAL BROADCAST CATECHISM 38–39 (17th ed. 2011). 
127 See id. at 36. 
148 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXV:117 
ers have, for the most part, tolerated broadcaster review of their 
messages and purchased time at market rates, despite the relative 
ease of getting on a ballot.128 However, the incentives that might 
lead someone to obtain ballot access for a federal race in order to 
invoke candidate political broadcasting rights have increased in re-
cent years. Most significantly, as the advertising prices paid by 
non-candidate political advertisers have skyrocketed, the disparity 
between rates paid by those advertisers and the rates paid by can-
didates has also grown dramatically. Outside spending on election 
advocacy, often in the form of broadcast television ads, tripled 
from 2008 to 2012, the first Presidential election year after Citizens 
United v. FEC129 was decided, topping $1 billion for the first 
time.130 This increased spending has been reflected in increased 
demand for broadcast time and, accordingly, much higher prices 
for non-candidate political advertisers.131 
                                                                                                                            
128 While states are permitted to pass ballot access laws as part of their regulation of fair 
elections, states may not unduly burden the associational rights of voters and candidates. 
See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). Thus, ballot access tends to be 
reasonably attainable. For example, in the Florida congressional district where Randall 
Terry was on the ballot for the House of Representatives, he would have had to file the 
requisite “oath of candidate” form, pay the filing fee, and file a petition with at least 
2,298 signatures. FLA. STAT. §§ 99.061, 99.095, 99.0955 (2011); see also 2012 Federal 
Qualifying Handbook, Florida Division of Elections, Oct. 2011, available at 
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/publications/pdf/2011/2012_Federal_Qualifying_Handbo
ok.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2014). 
129 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
130 Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Party Committees, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2014). Independent expenditure and electioneering communication 
spending by outside groups quadrupled between 2006 and 2010, and 72% of political 
advertising spending by outside groups in 2010 came from sources that were prohibited 
from spending money in 2006. Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision Profoundly 
Affects Political Landscape, OPENSECRETS.ORG, (May 5, 2011), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05/citizens-united-decision-profoundly-affects-
political-landscape.html. For analysis of the causal effects of Citizens United on political 
spending, see generally Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States 
Divided: An Empirical Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315 (2014). 
131 See Bachman, supra note 125; see also Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure 
Requirements for Television Broadcasters, 27 FCC Rcd. 4535 (Apr. 27, 2012) 
(“[P]olitical ad spending is rapidly increasing.”). While prices often rise across the board, 
for all advertisers and classes of time, candidates who buy expensive, last-minute spots 
are entitled to rebates down to lowest unit charge where it is determined that a 
comparable ad (typically ordered by a long-term commercial advertiser much further in 
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B. FCC Tolerance of Pretextual Candidates 
Obtaining ballot access in order to invoke candidate political 
broadcasting rights may also have become more attractive since 
2012 due to the FCC’s effective ratification of such a strategy. 
Prior to that time, it was not clear that the Commission would re-
quire broadcasters to air the ads of pretextual candidates under the 
reasonable access statute. After all, in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, the Court 
had emphasized the limited nature of the right created by the sta-
tute, the narrow purpose for which the right could be invoked (ad-
vancing one’s candidacy once a campaign has commenced), and 
the FCC’s policy of not reviewing de novo broadcasters’ exercise of 
reasonable judgment with regard to when and how to fulfill their 
obligations under the statute.132 And in the intervening years, the 
Commission had not decided upon a complaint against a broadcas-
ter alleged to have denied reasonable access to a candidate on the 
basis that he was not actually seeking office.133 
Yet in October 2012, faced with numerous complaints by Ran-
dall Terry and his allies that broadcast stations were refusing to air 
their ads, the Commission decided upon two of the complaints, one 
informally by political broadcasting staff and one through issuance 
of a memorandum opinion and order by the Chief of the Media Bu-
reau. In each case, Commission staff found that it would not be 
reasonable for the station at issue to deny access.134 
Both matters involved fairly egregious evidence that the indi-
vidual claiming candidate reasonable access rights was not actually 
seeking to gain office. Randall Terry, who filed one of the com-
plaints that was decided upon, had publicly proclaimed his strategy 
of taking advantage of federal political broadcasting law to force 
broadcasters to air his messages in states where he was “NOT” on 
                                                                                                                            
advance) has aired at a lower price. Non-candidate political advertisers receive no such 
benefit. 
132 CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 397 (1981). 
133 Indeed, it is unlikely that broadcasters had engaged in such a practice more than 
occasionally, if at all. Even with regard to the widespread efforts of Terry and his allies in 
2012, broadcasters tended to refuse reasonable access only where other legal issues arose 
with regard to the purported candidate’s political broadcasting rights. Interview with 
Kurt Wimmer, supra note 21. 
134 Telephone Decision of Robert Baker, supra note 27; Complaint of Randall Terry for 
President and Pro-Life Candidates, 27 FCC Rcd. 13418 (Oct. 31, 2012). 
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the ballot.135 He had also recruited like-minded anti-abortion activ-
ists to employ similar strategies. One of those recruits, Andrew 
Beacham, filed the other complaint decided by the FCC in October 
2012. Beacham was an Indiana resident on the ballot for the U.S. 
House of Representatives in Kentucky. He provided no evidence, 
nor even an assertion, that he would relocate to Kentucky by Elec-
tion Day in order to become qualified, under Article I, section 2 of 
the U.S. Constitution, to represent Kentucky in Congress.136 In 
addition, the template-style issue advertisements Terry, Beacham, 
and their allies sought to run typically contained no image or men-
tion of the “candidate,” the state in which he or she was running, 
or the office he or she purported to seek, other than in the manda-
tory disclosure at the end.137 
In denying access to Terry and Beacham, the broadcast stations 
advanced two lines of argument. First, each case involved a dis-
puted interpretation of an FCC rule or policy. In the Terry case, 
the Washington, D.C. broadcast station argued that no federal can-
didate was entitled to reasonable access on the station on the basis 
of his presence on the ballot in West Virginia.138 In support of this 
argument, the station relied on a methodology employed by the 
FCC in several other contexts to demonstrate that it did not broad-
cast into West Virginia.139 In the Beacham case, the Louisville, 
Kentucky station argued that because Beacham was not currently 
qualified to represent Kentucky in Congress and had provided no 
evidence that he would become qualified by Election Day, he was 
not a “legally qualified candidate” under FCC rules.140 
Second, and more importantly for the purposes of this Article, 
both stations argued that interpreting the statutory reasonable 
access provision to require broadcasters to air ads of individuals not 
seeking office would unconstitutionally exceed the “narrow hold-
                                                                                                                            
135 See Letter from Randall Terry, supra note 16. 
136 Telephone Decision of Robert Baker, supra note 27. 
137 See Labash, supra note 1. 
138 Complaint of Randall Terry, 27 FCC Rcd. 13418, 13420 (Oct. 31, 2012). 
139 Id. 
140 Telephone Decision of Robert Baker, supra note 27. Specifically, the station argued 
that Beacham failed to meet prong (a)(2) of 47 C.F.R. § 73.1940, which states that a 
legally qualified candidate for public office “[i]s qualified under the applicable local, State 
or Federal law to hold the office for which he or she is a candidate.” 
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ing of CBS, Inc. v. FCC.”141 According to the broadcasters, “[o]nly 
because of the limited scope of [the statutory reasonable access 
provision] and the paramount interest in having the ‘electorate . . . 
intelligently evaluate the candidates personal qualities and their 
positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on 
election day’ did the Court conclude that the statute ‘properly bal-
ance[d] the First Amendment rights of federal candidates, the pub-
lic, and broadcasters.’”142 The stations argued that requiring 
broadcasters to grant access to Terry and Beacham to air material 
not aimed at advancing a genuine candidacy would impermissibly 
broaden the scope of reasonable access and would “no more 
serve[] the interest of informed voting than would granting a right 
of access to any private individual or organization advocating a po-
litical opinion.”143 
The FCC, however, has remained silent with regard to the sta-
tions’ constitutional arguments, addressing only interpretations of 
FCC rules or policy in its October 2012 decisions. The Commis-
sion decided in favor of Terry by establishing that a different me-
thodology should be employed for determining a station’s signal 
contours than the one that the Washington, D.C. station had used, 
without appearing even to consider the broadcasters’ contention 
that requiring them to grant access to a pretextual candidate would 
violate their First Amendment rights.144 And, more significantly, 
the Commission decided for Beacham by holding that it would de-
fer to a state election commission’s choice to place an individual on 
the ballot, in determining whether that person is a legally qualified 
federal candidate entitled to reasonable access.145 The FCC thus 
chose to defer judgment of whether a purported candidate is legally 
qualified under FCC rules to state agencies that do not typically 
review whether an applicant for federal ballot access meets the re-
levant constitutional requirements, and that are constitutionally 
prohibited from placing additional requirements—such as requir-
ing a candidate to be a resident of the state as of the time he is 
                                                                                                                            
141 See Gannett Petition for Reconsideration, supra note 13, at 16. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Complaint of Randall Terry, 27 FCC Rcd. 13418, 13421–22 (Oct. 31, 2012). 
145 Telephone Decision of Robert Baker, supra note 27. 
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placed on the ballot—on ballot access for federal races.146 In this 
way, the Commission sent the unmistakable message that it will 
neither prevent the invocation of reasonable access rights by indi-
viduals who obtain ballot access without actually seeking to gain 
office, nor allow broadcasters to do so. 
The FCC thus effectively established a bright-line rule—any 
person on the ballot for a federal race must be afforded reasonable 
access147—where it might instead have allowed broadcasters to 
consider, as part of their judgment of how much and what kind of 
access is reasonable, evidence that the purported candidate is not 
actually seeking office. As discussed in Part III.B, the Commission 
could have permitted stations to make this determination by em-
ploying neutral factors similar to those already in use when evaluat-
ing whether a write-in candidate has made a “substantial showing 
of bona fide candidacy” and is thereby entitled to reasonable 
access.148 
The Commission’s bright-line rule has the benefit of prevent-
ing broadcasters from abusing any hypothetical discretion (to eva-
luate whether a purported candidate has engaged in substantial 
campaigning activity) by denying access to a candidate on the ballot 
because they do not like what he has to say or because they believe 
he has little chance of winning. But the rule also has the cost of 
forcing broadcasters, who are normally understood to exercise 
broad editorial discretion protected by the First Amendment, to air 
messages from some individuals who do not seek to hold office. 
The Commission’s employment of this prophylactic rule thus re-
flects its apparent position that such an additional incursion on 
                                                                                                                            
146 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
147 There may be an exception to this in the primary election context, where a political 
party disavows a person’s eligibility for the party’s nomination. See Complaint of Randall 
Terry against WMAQ-TV, supra note 19; Petition for Reconsideration by Larouche 
Exploratory Committee, 11 FCC Rcd. 10423 (Sept. 15, 1996). Leaving the decision of 
whether a person is a bona fide candidate in the hands of the relevant political party may 
alleviate any FCC concerns of content discrimination (or the perception of content 
discrimination) by broadcasters or by the FCC itself. 
148 In the context of write-in candidates, broadcasters look to neutral criteria, such as 
the extent to which the purported candidate has made campaign speeches and distributed 
campaign literature, in determining whether an individual invoking reasonable access 
rights has made “a substantial showing that he or she is a bona fide candidate.” 47 C.F.R. 
§ 73.1940(b)(2) (2013). 
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broadcasters’ editorial discretion is constitutionally permissible—
justified by virtue of broadcasters’ obligations to serve the public 
and because the bright-line rule ensures that no genuine federal 
candidate will be denied the opportunity to address the public 
through the use of broadcasting. 
However, the state of the law following CBS, Inc. v. FCC149 and 
Forbes150 is not so clear. While Red Lion remains good law, and with 
it the idea that the government may regulate broadcast to pursue 
certain public goods, including the First Amendment values under-
lying reasonable access, that is only half the story. Broadcasters, 
too, possess speech rights protected by the First Amendment, and 
the Court has been clear that “broad rights of access for outside 
speakers would be antithetical, as a general rule, to the discretion 
that stations and their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill their 
journalistic purpose and statutory obligations.”151 It is, therefore, 
uncertain how much, and in what ways, the FCC may burden 
broadcasters’ speech in enforcing reasonable access consistently 
with the First Amendment. I turn to this question next. 
III. WALKING THE TIGHTROPE OF BROADCAST 
REGULATION 
In this Part, I argue that the government may use its regulatory 
powers to impose order in the use of a shared resource—the at-
mosphere—that is easily accessible for incompatible uses, in order 
to pursue certain democratically agreed-upon objectives unrelated 
to the suppression of speech. In constructing its broadcast licensing 
scheme, Congress sought to incentivize broadcasters to produce 
coherent, balanced, and informative programming—content that is 
valuable to a democratic conception of the First Amendment and 
that is likely to be underproduced by the market. However, because 
Congress has chosen to use private speakers to carry out the essen-
tial tasks of informing the public and fostering public discussion 
and, indeed, because freedom from government control is neces-
sary for these tasks, the First Amendment requires that the FCC 
                                                                                                                            
149 453 U.S. 367 (1981). 
150 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
151 Id. at 673. 
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maintain a close fit between the legislative ends it is tasked with 
furthering and the means it chooses for doing so. 
In the case of reasonable access, Congress has sought to ensure 
candidates for public office the opportunity to engage with the elec-
torate in order to “more fully and completely inform the voters” 
on candidates’ positions on the issues.152 However, because any 
grant of access to outside speakers necessarily limits the speech of 
broadcasters, the right created by Congress, as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court, is narrow, “invoked by [federal candidates] only 
for the purpose of advancing their candidacies once a campaign has 
commenced.”153 By contrast, the prophylactic rule imposed by the 
FCC in its October 2012 decisions has significant potential to inter-
fere with broadcasters’ editorial freedom and to reduce the oppor-
tunities for genuine candidates to speak directly to the public 
through the broadcast medium. For these reasons, this policy raises 
serious constitutional questions. Where, as here, an alternative pol-
icy exists that would better achieve the legislative purposes of rea-
sonable access and would burden less speech, courts should reject 
the FCC’s choice of a more burdensome policy. 
A. Pursuing Communications Policy Through Structural Regulation 
In light of the history and purposes of broadcast regulation, as 
well as the development of case law since Red Lion, a conception of 
broadcasters as trustees subject to extensive government regulation 
in furtherance of the public interest is far too simplistic. From the 
early days of broadcast regulation, Congress has rejected FCC cen-
sorship of broadcast or treatment of broadcasters as common carri-
ers.154 Instead of retaining pervasive government control of the 
airwaves, Congress chose a licensing system of predominantly pri-
vate broadcasters in order to “strike a proper balance of private and 
public control.”155 The Supreme Court, recognizing this, has made 
it clear that, in regulating broadcast, the FCC must “walk a 
‘tightrope’ to preserve the First Amendment values written into 
                                                                                                                            
152 CBS, 453 U.S. at 379. 
153 Id. at 396. 
154 See supra Part I.A.1. 
155 Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 104 (1973). 
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the [Communications Act].”156 In justifying intrusions on broad-
casters’ constitutionally protected speech rights, the FCC needs 
more than a rationale explaining the origin of the government’s 
regulatory powers over the broadcast medium.157 The Commission 
must also identify the First Amendment values Congress is pur-
suing through its exercise of regulatory powers and evaluate 
whether its policies further those values without intruding unne-
cessarily on broadcasters’ speech. 
1. The Origin of Congress’s Regulatory Power Over 
Broadcast 
Regulation of the broadcast medium has always “represent[ed] 
something of a First Amendment anomaly.”158 Broadcasters are 
subject to programming obligations, as well as restrictions on the 
content of their speech, that would be considered unconstitutional 
if imposed on other media.159 For example, in Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo, the Supreme Court struck down a statute 
granting candidates for public office a right to reply to newspaper 
criticism, despite having upheld an analogous FCC broadcast poli-
cy just five years earlier, in Red Lion.160 The Court has justified this 
difference in treatment on the unique physical characteristics of the 
broadcast spectrum, explaining in Red Lion, “[w]here there are 
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are 
frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First 
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every 
individual to speak, write, or publish.”161 On the basis of spectrum 
scarcity, the government was permitted to place conditions on li-
                                                                                                                            
156 Id. at 117. 
157 And, as I discuss infra, even with regard to providing this initial rationale, the 
“scarcity” of the broadcast spectrum is a descriptively weak basis on which to rest the 
government’s regulatory power over broadcast. See R.H. Coase, The Federal 
Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959); YOO, supra note 33, at 245; Balkin, 
supra note 4, at 20. 
158 YOO, supra note 33, at 255. 
159 See id. at 260–66. 
160 See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254 (1974) (holding that 
“governmental coercion” to publish material that newspapers would otherwise not have 
chosen to publish infringed on the editorial freedom guaranteed to the press under the 
First Amendment). 
161 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969). 
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censees “in favor of others whose views should be expressed on 
this unique medium.”162 
a) Beyond Scarcity 
As others have documented well, the scarcity rationale has 
been the target of criticism on many fronts over the years.163 As 
early as 1959—before Red Lion was decided—Ronald Coase of-
fered his economic critique of the rationale, observing: 
[I]t is a commonplace of economics that almost all 
resources used in the economic system (and not 
simply radio and television frequencies) are limited 
in amount and scarce, in that people would like to 
use more than exists. Land, labor, and capital are 
scarce, but this of itself, does not call for govern-
ment regulation.164 
Other finite resources, such as land, have not been thought to 
require extensive administrative oversight once the initial scheme 
of property rights has been defined.165 And even in the context of 
scarce communicative resources, like major metropolitan newspa-
pers, the Court has not considered scarcity alone to be a basis to 
treat media owners as public trustees.166 More recently, Christo-
pher Yoo has argued that in putting forth spectrum scarcity as the 
justification for broadcast regulation, the Court engaged in circular 
logic, failing to recognize that the reason the broadcast spectrum is 
scarce is that the government apportioned only a small number of 
the radio frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum for use of 
broadcast technology.167 And perhaps the criticism of the scarcity 
                                                                                                                            
162 Id. at 390. 
163 See, e.g., YOO, supra note 33, at 266–91. 
164 Coase, supra note 157, at 14. 
165 YOO, supra note 33, at 268. 
166 Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public 
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1127 (1993); see also BOLLINGER, supra note 41, at 60. 
167 The electromagnetic spectrum is the range of all possible frequencies of 
electromagnetic radiation. However, technologies such as television and radio 
broadcasting, mobile phones, and wireless networking transmit data using only a portion 
of the spectrum called the radio frequencies—in common parlance, these technologies 
transmit radio waves. In order to minimize interference from conflicting radio signals and 
to make sure that there are adequate opportunities to use various technologies that 
transmit radio waves, the FCC gives permission to operators of different types of 
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rationale most frequently heard today is that it has been under-
mined by the digital revolution. As Jack Balkin writes, “Broadcast 
media now compete with cable, satellite, and the Internet for view-
er attention. In theory, at least, digital technologies offer everyone 
the potential to become broadcasters.”168 
Spectrum scarcity is clearly a poor description for the limita-
tions of the broadcast medium that have led the federal govern-
ment to intervene in its use. The atmosphere is all around us. The 
broadcast spectrum is actually exceedingly accessible, rather than 
scarce. A tremendous number of people could broadcast at the 
same time and on the same frequency, at such signal strengths that 
they reach much the same (or at least a greatly overlapping) geo-
graphic area.169 They simply could not all effectively reach large 
audiences, due to signal interference.170 
The descriptive weakness of the spectrum scarcity rationale 
does not mean, however, that there is no legitimate basis for gov-
ernment regulation of broadcasting.171 Broadcast regulation can in-
                                                                                                                            
technology to transmit waves at only a particular range of frequencies. In the case of 
certain types of technology, including television broadcasting, the FCC further assigns a 
particular frequency at which a particular licensee may operate. 
168 Balkin, supra note 4, at 20. 
169 See Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 25, 39–41 (2002). 
170 Professor Benkler, arguing that treatment of spectrum as a commons would 
incentivize development of “smarter” broadcast receivers, describes signal interference 
thusly: 
“Interference” describes the condition of a stupid lone receiver faced 
with multiple sources of radiation that it is trying to decode but, in its 
simplicity, cannot. To solve this problem, we created and have 
implemented since 1912 a regulatory system that prohibits everyone 
from radiating electromagnetic waves at frequencies that we know 
how to use for communication, and then permits in individual cases 
someone, somewhere, to radiate within tightly regulated parameters 
of frequency, power, location, and timeframe, designed to permit the 
poor, lonely, stupid receivers to deliver to their human owners 
intelligible human messages. 
Id. at 39–40. 
171 See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 
U. PA. L. REV. 927, 944 (2006) (“Once a principle calls a practice into question, those 
who would defend the challenged practice must develop a rationale for distinguishing the 
practice from other practices to which the principle applies . . . . [T]he scarcity rationale 
can be deployed to limit the free speech principle. Further political contestation, 
however, can disrupt these mediating strategies. At some point a rationale no longer 
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stead be understood to have originated as a form of structural regu-
lation, addressing the twin problems of signal interference and eco-
nomic instability.172 Professor Balkin analogizes the most basic 
form of broadcast regulation to a type of zoning: 
Government sets up a plan that allows people to 
broadcast in different frequencies in different loca-
tions, with differing strengths and at different times, 
in order to facilitate successful broadcast transmis-
sion and reception. It can also regulate the kinds of 
technologies used for transmission and reception in 
order to manage and prevent interference.173 
As discussed above in Part I.A, Congress intervened into the 
chaos that marked the early days of broadcasting in order to reduce 
the total number of broadcasters. Due to the large number of 
broadcast stations transmitting signals at similar frequencies, it was 
difficult for the public to reliably receive radio transmissions. And 
because early broadcasters had not yet developed profitable busi-
ness models, stations often disappeared quickly after opening up 
shop. Congress’s intervention, in the form of the Radio Act and, 
later, the Communications Act, made possible the development of 
a self-sufficient broadcasting industry capable of dependably serv-
ing the public.174 
b) Choosing a Regulatory Scheme 
In exercising its regulatory power to coordinate the transmis-
sion of wireless radio signals, Congress chose from a variety of 
possible regulatory schemes.175 At one end of the spectrum, Con-
gress could have passed one of the bills introduced to create a gov-
                                                                                                                            
appears plausible or legitimate, and that is the point at which it begins to break down as a 
method of legitimation. This is what happened with the scarcity rationale during the 
1980s, when the FCC embarked on a period of whole-scale deregulation of the broadcast 
media and abolished the fairness doctrine that the Court had upheld in Red Lion v. 
FCC.”). 
172 Jack Balkin, The Fairness Doctrine, Part II—The Constitutionality of Broadcast 
Regulation, BALKINIZATION (Aug. 8, 2007), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/08/
fairness-doctrine-part-ii.html. 
173 Id. 
174 Supra Part I.A. 
175 See Coase, supra note 157, at 5. 
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ernment monopoly of wireless communications.176 Congress might 
even have chosen to create a private monopoly by extending a li-
cense to a single corporation, had it taken the position urged by 
some stakeholders, including the U.S. Navy. Concerned with the 
hindrance of “public business,” including response to distress 
calls, caused by pre-regulatory “bedlam” on the airwaves, Secre-
tary of the Navy Josephus Daniels testified: “There are only two 
methods of operating the wireless: either by the government or for 
it to license one corporation—there is no other safe or possible me-
thod of operating the wireless.”177 
At the other end of the spectrum, Congress could have auc-
tioned off private property rights to transmit signals using a partic-
ular portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, as Ronald Coase 
championed in the 1950s.178 According to Professor Coase, the 
broadcasting industry should “be able to obtain frequencies on the 
same basis as it now obtains its labor, buildings, land, and equip-
ment”—according to how much broadcasters, as compared to 
those who would use those frequencies for other purposes, are will-
ing to pay for them.179 Under this theory, public needs can be 
served by government entities, who would pay for property rights 
                                                                                                                            
176 See id. at 3–4. 
177 Id. at 2–3. Although these calls for government or corporate monopolization of 
wireless communications in the United States primarily predated the proliferation of 
broadcast—rather than point-to-point—radio communications, concerns for public 
welfare have led the governments of other countries to establish national noncommercial 
broadcast services to the exclusion of private broadcasting. For example, until 1993, Israel 
permitted no commercial broadcasting. Instead, following the recommendations of 
United Nations Education, Science, and Culture Organization (“UNESCO”) experts, 
Israel operated a public broadcasting service intended to advance national goals, including 
introducing the Hebrew language to new immigrants, integration of immigrants into the 
civic, economic, social, and cultural life of the country, and the provision of equal 
opportunity of education for all. See Amit Schejter, The Cultural Obligations of Broadcast 
Television in Israel, 56 INT’L COMM. GAZETTE 183, 184–85, 188 (1996). 
178 Coase, supra note 157, at 17–18 (“There can be little doubt that the idea of using 
private property and the pricing system in the allocation of frequencies is one which is 
completely unfamiliar to most of those concerned with broadcasting policy . . . . This 
‘novel’ theory’ (novel with Adam Smith) is, of course, that the allocation of resources 
should be determined by the forces of the market rather than as a result of government 
decisions.”). 
179 Id. at 20–21. 
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in frequencies in order to use those frequencies for various types of 
radio transmissions, including public broadcasting.180 
Instead, Congress chose to walk a middle path, creating a re-
newable licensing system for a primarily private broadcast industry, 
while reserving the right to ensure that licenses were held by those 
who would devote at least some of their time and resources to serv-
ing the public interest. In doing so, Congress reduced the number 
of broadcasters, enabling the remaining broadcasters to reach large 
audiences and enabling audiences to reliably receive broadcasters’ 
signals. This regulatory scheme also provided the stability neces-
sary for a self-sustaining private broadcast industry to arise, rein-
forcing the reliability of television service for the public. 
Short of retaining government control of all radio frequencies 
without adequate justification for that action—essentially substi-
tuting regulation of a common resource for the nationalization of 
that resource—it is unclear why Congress would have been consti-
tutionally prohibited from choosing one broadcast regulatory 
scheme over another.181 The First Amendment is not normally 
thought to dictate the government’s choice of granting licenses for 
use of certain radio frequencies, as compared to auctioning more 
permanent property rights or maintaining the availability of the 
airwaves as a public commons. Indeed, the FCC currently does 
each of these things, with regard to different technologies and por-
tions of the spectrum.182 
Yet any legislative choice of a broadcast regulatory system nec-
essarily has implications for how broadcast radio and television are 
used as communications media. For example, as Professor Coase 
recognized, a system of property rights in broadcast frequencies 
would have been inconsistent with regulations for the operation of 
broadcast stations as detailed as we currently have, because such 
regulations “would severely limit the extent to which the way the 
frequency was used could be determined by the forces of the mar-
                                                                                                                            
180 See id. at 21. 
181 See Balkin, supra note 172 (“The threshold constitutional question is whether 
government has any obligation to choose one kind of zoning system over another. The 
answer is that, within very broad parameters, it does not.”). 
182 See Philip J. Weiser & Dale N. Hatfield, Policing the Spectrum Commons, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 663, 666–74 (2005). 
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ket.”183 But, as C. Edwin Baker thoroughly demonstrated, due to 
unique characteristics of media products—including difficulties of 
pricing products with significantly higher first-copy costs and the 
influence of advertisers on the content produced by media compa-
nies—“the divergence between what the market produces and 
what people want can be expected to be massive.”184 Thus, it is 
reasonable to believe that under a market-based broadcast property 
rights system, broadcast communications would have reflected 
commercial interests, rather than the public interest, even more 
than they do now.185 
Similarly, it is unclear why Congress would not have been con-
stitutionally permitted to establish a common-carriage system for 
broadcast—essentially a system of government-run or privately run 
public access channels—like the one it established for some other 
communications carriers, including telephone companies.186 Yet, 
                                                                                                                            
183 Coase, supra note 157, at 25. 
184 Baker, supra note 37, at 96. According to Baker, “[F]our features of media products 
can lead to results contrary to what the audience what the audience wants—what it would 
pay for.” Id. at 14. First, because media products have large first-copy costs and very low 
costs for additional consumers, charging the average cost excludes people who would pay 
for the story or broadcast than it costs to include them among the recipients, while setting 
the price at marginal cost would create insufficient incentives to produce the media 
product. Id. at 9–10, 20–40. Second, although media products often produce significant 
externalities—for example, an entire society, not just newspaper readers, may benefit 
from the exposure of government corruption—media companies are often unable to 
capture those benefits in revenue. Id. at 10–11, 41–62. Third, because advertisers, not just 
consumers, pay for the transmission of media content, content choices often reflect 
advertisers’ interests instead of audiences’ preferences. Id. at 11–12, 88–95. Finally, the 
combination of multiple purchasers with varied preferences, including preferences that 
are not yet formed, “enhances the opportunity for [advertisers] to influence content away 
from what the audience wants in the dimensions about which the audience finds 
knowledge most difficult to obtain.” Id. at 12–14, 87-95. 
185 See id. at 115 (“Given the immense scale of potential positive externalities, market-
based firms will produce and deliver drastically inadequate amounts of ‘quality’ media 
content (with ‘quality’ meaning here content that has significant positive 
externalities).”). 
186 In a system of common carriage, such as that operated by telephone companies, all 
members of the public must be allowed use of the communications system on a 
nondiscriminatory basis. See, e.g., Iowa Telecomm. Servs., Inc., v. Iowa Util. Bd., 563 
F.3d 743, 745–47 (8th Cir. 2009) (describing the treatment of common carriers under the 
Communications Act of 1934). In the context of broadcast television, a government-
enforced system of common carriage would likely operate similarly to that of a public 
access channel on cable television or the type of public forum operated by the government 
that is only open for use by one speaker or group of speakers at a time, such as a stage in a 
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looking to cable television public access channels to illustrate the 
point, we can assume that the programming available on public-
access broadcast stations would have looked markedly different 
than the professionally created programs we now see on commer-
cial and public broadcast television channels.187 
And even within the licensing scheme that has been established 
by Congress, regulations that would normally be thought of as 
“zoning” regulations, rather than as programming regulations, 
nonetheless have a tremendous impact on the content of commu-
nications. For instance, the First Amendment is not normally 
thought to have anything to say with regard to the geographic area 
for which a broadcast license is granted. Yet, the Federal Radio 
Commission’s decision in 1928 to set aside certain frequencies for 
“clear channels” on which licensed stations could transmit high-
power signals across vast geographic regions allowed for the crea-
tion of national radio networks—for the first time connecting 
Americans with an instantaneous, nationally shared set of know-
ledge and experiences.188 By contrast, with the national networks 
already in place by the time television was developed, Congress 
and the FCC decided to award television licenses locally, rather 
than nationally (as has been done in many other countries)—a poli-
cy that has promoted the availability of locally oriented news and 
other content.189 
If all, or at least a very substantial portion of, broadcast regula-
tion affects the nature of communications that take place within the 
broadcast medium, it should not only be constitutionally permissi-
ble for Congress and the Commission to consider those effects in 
                                                                                                                            
public park. Owners of broadcast stations would be able to set rules and procedures for 
use of the station but would probably not be permitted to discriminate between speakers 
or messages. Cf. Denver Area Ed. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 
760–66 (1996). 
187 Consider the difference between the television shows created by and transmitted on 
MTV or CNN and the typical programming on cable public-access channels. 
188 See STEVEN WALDMAN, FCC, THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES: THE 
CHANGING MEDIA LANDSCAPE IN A BROADBAND AGE 276 (July 2011), available at 
http://transition.fcc.gov/osp/inc-report/The_Information_Needs_of_Comm
unities.pdf (asserting that the creation of clear channels allowed business models to 
develop more quickly because radio stations could attract national—not just local—
advertising). 
189 See id. 
2014] UNREASONABLE ACCESS 163 
deciding what policies to implement—but such consideration of 
how different communications policies will affect the medium 
should actually be expected of legislators and regulators, as a mat-
ter of good governance. Moreover, as the examples described in 
this section show, there is no clear line between “zoning” regula-
tion and content regulation. There is instead a variety of forms of 
regulation having greater or lesser impacts on the speech that is 
broadcast. To the extent that Congress has chosen to exercise its 
coordination power over the electromagnetic spectrum to pursue a 
particular vision for how the broadcast medium can best be struc-
tured to serve the public, evaluation of the constitutionality of a 
broadcast regulation should not turn on whether the regulation is 
expressed in terms of geographic area, signal strength, and radio 
frequency, rather than as station ownership restrictions, access 
rights for outside speakers, or requirements that licensees air cer-
tain types of programming pursuant to their public interest obliga-
tions. Instead, as I show next, courts should evaluate the permissi-
bility of the objectives pursued through broadcast regulation and, 
taking into account the speech interests involved, should insist that 
government actors select a rule well-adapted to furthering those 
objectives. 
2. Regulating Broadcast to Pursue Communications Policy 
If the First Amendment protects not just our individual rights 
to speak and be heard, but also our collective right to deliberate and 
to determine the shape of our government and our society,190 then 
we must be able to produce a technological and regulatory infra-
structure that can facilitate that deliberation.191 Even where no in-
dividual may possess a judicially enforceable right to receive “in-
                                                                                                                            
190 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 
487 (2011); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF 
GOVERNMENT (1948). 
191 See Balkin, supra note 4, at 52; see also C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION & 
DEMOCRACY 126 (2006) (“If the ultimate beneficiary is the audience or the public—
either as media consumers or as citizens who profit from a press that serves democratic 
needs—whether ownership restrictions violate the First Amendment should depend 
primarily on whether the regulation and the government’s capacity to regulate serves or 
disserves the public’s interest in an ideal media order.”). 
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formation from diverse and antagonistic sources,”192 we collective-
ly possess the right to pursue it as a constitutional norm.193 Accor-
dingly, when Congress exercises its regulatory powers over broad-
cast—an exercise that, as described above, necessarily involves 
making decisions about the nature of communications to be pro-
moted within the medium—it may, at least within certain parame-
ters, pursue a communications policy furthering democratically 
agreed-upon objectives. Courts have found this sort of communica-
tions-conscious broadcast regulation to be permissible even where 
pursuit of such policies may burden broadcasters’ speech rights.194 
Nonetheless, because we also value highly the rights and con-
tributions of individual speakers in public discourse, including 
those who are engaged in editorial activities, the speech of broad-
casters must also be protected.195 Broadcast regulation should aim 
to facilitate speech, rather than to silence broadcasters.196 And the 
method of regulation chosen should not burden substantially more 
broadcaster speech than is required to accomplish regulatory objec-
tives. As the Court noted in League of Women Voters, “the thrust 
of . . . restrictions [on the broadcasting industry] has generally been 
to secure the public’s First Amendment interest in receiving a ba-
lanced presentation of views on diverse matters of public con-
cern.”197 But even where the government has pursued this highly 
                                                                                                                            
192 FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (quoting Assoc. 
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)) (finding that the public interest standard of 
the Communications Act necessarily invites reference to this First Amendment goal). 
193 See Balkin, supra note 4, at 52–53; see also Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The 
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221 (1978) 
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the federal judiciary will not enforce these margins.”). 
194 See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 
U.S. 367 (1969). 
195 See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673–75 (1998); 
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Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 379–81 (1984); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 
U.S. 241, 261 (1974). 
196 See BOLLINGER, supra note 41, at 127 (broadcast regulation should be about 
expanding the range of speech available and not about silencing broadcasters); see also 
J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 
DUKE L.J. 1131, 1134–1139 (1996) (critiquing constitutional justifications for content-based 
regulation of violence and indecency). 
197 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 380. 
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regarded purpose, requirements that unduly intrude on broadcas-
ters’ editorial discretion—including those that would “tend to turn 
broadcasters into common carriers”—have been struck down.198 
Although the Court’s decision in Turner Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. FCC does not apply to broadcast, that decision demonstrates 
a similar, balanced approach to media regulation.199 The Court rec-
ognized that the government may pursue democratically valuable, 
communications-conscious goals in regulating a medium that had 
come under its regulatory purview, so long as media owners’ 
speech interests were not disproportionately burdened.200 
In Turner, the Supreme Court considered a provision of the 
Cable Act requiring cable operators to carry a minimum number of 
broadcast stations. In regulating the cable industry, “Congress em-
ployed ‘its regulatory powers over the economy to impose order 
upon a market in dysfunction.’”201 The Court recognized that ca-
ble operators engage in speech activity protected by the First 
Amendment and that this speech was burdened by the “must-
carry” provision, because it reduced the number of channels cable 
operators had available to carry other programming.202 Nonethe-
less, the Court found that the provision would pass constitutional 
muster so long as it furthered an important governmental interest 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, without burdening 
substantially more speech than was necessary.203 Although re-
manding the case for further development of the record, the Court 
accepted as constitutionally permissible—and, indeed, as further-
ing First Amendment values—the government’s interests of: “(1) 
preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast televi-
sion, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information 
from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition 
in the market for television programming.”204 
                                                                                                                            
198 Id. 
199 See Turner, 512 U.S. at 664. 
200 See id. 
201 Id. at 635 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 859 F. Supp. 32, 40 (D.D.C. 
1993)). 
202 Turner, 512 U.S. at 636, 644–45. 
203 Id. at 662. 
204 Id. at 663–64. The Court found that these purposes were unrelated to the 
suppression of speech because they were “not activated by any particular message spoken 
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Similarly, in choosing from many regulatory options to estab-
lish a licensing scheme to overcome widespread signal interference 
and economic instability in broadcast, Congress has pursued a par-
ticular vision of how the medium could best be used to serve public 
First Amendment interests, including the broad dissemination of 
ideas from a wide variety sources, providing communities with “an 
outlet for exchange on matters of local concern,” and ensuring the 
availability of a free source of information on important matters.205 
Because producing objective, comprehensive, and informative pro-
gramming is a public good, private, unregulated media organiza-
tions are unlikely to deliver adequate amounts of diverse, quality 
content.206 We can, therefore, understand the purpose of the 
broadcast licensing scheme—including the conditions placed on 
licenses—as a form of communications policy, seeking to incentiv-
ize private broadcasters to produce programming that informs 
viewers and contributes to setting the agenda for public discussion. 
Congress gave to private broadcasters not just renewable inter-
ests in the use of portions of the spectrum, but also an accompany-
ing role to play in serving the public. Broadcasters do not simply 
facilitate a diverse array of speech by others—if this had been Con-
gress’s only aim, a system of common carriage might have done 
just as well. Rather, broadcasters endeavor to use their indepen-
dent editorial discretion to present speech of their own, together 
with speech of others, in a coherent, balanced way that fosters pub-
lic discourse across societal divides.207 Cass Sunstein describes tel-
evision broadcasters as “general-interest intermediaries,” who ex-
pose us to unplanned and unchosen encounters that cause us to 
learn what many of our fellow citizens think and why they think it 
                                                                                                                            
by cable operators,” and because they “confer[red] benefits upon all full-power, local 
broadcasters, whatever the content of their programming.” Id. at 655. 
205 See id. at 662–63. 
206 Baker, supra note 37, at 115; see also Balkin, supra note 172 (“Because information is a 
public good, valuable and useful information will likely be underproduced by market 
forces acting alone, so government investments in and regulations of information 
production can help make up the slack, so long as they do not otherwise violate the First 
Amendment. Therefore, the government may impose conditions on licensees if they help 
promote this goal.”). 
207 See Baker, supra note 37, at 143–47; CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 29–32 
(2009). 
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and also create a shared focus of attention for many people.208 
Without this shared focus, we may no longer have a sufficient 
common set of experiences or knowledge from which to draw. 
Such a set of shared information is necessary for forming a com-
mon identity as members of the same society,209 as well as for the 
formation of the public opinion through which we govern ourselves 
in a democracy.210 While there is certainly an important role for 
partisan and interest group media to play in the formation of public 
opinion, without common knowledge across group lines and some 
semblance of a common agenda for public discourse, dialogue be-
tween those groups or members of those groups cannot happen.211 
Broadcast media “allow ‘different classes and groups to take part 
in the same public dialogue’ and ‘promise a culture of mutuality 
that facilitates agreement and compromise.’”212 
Broadcast is certainly not the only medium capable of being 
employed to perform this intermediary function,213 but it is easy to 
see why Congress chose commercial television broadcasting to play 
this role. Broadcast television is a visually and aurally appealing 
technology that is accessible to people from many demographic 
                                                                                                                            
208 SUNSTEIN, supra note 207, at 29–32. Sunstein contrasts this to the experience of 
relying exclusively on filtered news—what he calls “The Daily Me.” As it becomes 
increasingly easy, with the help of the Internet, to access news and information targeted 
toward our own particular needs, interests, and views, we risk missing out on learning 
things or hearing views that we would not have chosen for ourselves but that may be 
interesting or important to us. 
209 See Baker, supra note 37, at 158–60. 
210 See Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 
1276 (1995). 
211 See Baker, supra note 37, at 148–49; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 207, at 57 (“To 
say the least, it will be difficult for people armed . . . opposing perspectives to reach 
anything like common ground or to make progress on the underlying questions. Consider 
how these difficulties will increase if people do not know the competing view, consistently 
avoid speaking with one another, and are unaware how to address divergent concerns of 
fellow citizens.”). 
212 Baker, supra note 37, at 189. 
213 Many newspapers, too, for example, have played a similar role for several decades. 
However, prior to the 1950s, “a majority of American papers . . . explicitly identified 
themselves as favoring one of the two political parties.” Tim Groeling & Erik Engstrom, 
Who Cleans Up When the Party’s Over? The Decline of Partisan Media and Rise of Split-
Ticket Voting in the 20th Century 7 (APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1451393. 
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groups for both entertainment and information.214 It can be used to 
deliver a lot of content quickly and effectively (particularly as com-
pared to technologies predating it).215 And when used for the enter-
tainment purposes that make it attractive to commercial advertis-
ers, such offerings also attract viewers, building audiences for pro-
gramming offering information and perspectives on matters of pub-
lic importance. Those entertainment offerings, too, can inform and 
educate viewers, in addition to providing them with shared cultural 
experiences. 
Moreover, in placing conditions on broadcast licenses that seek 
to induce private broadcasters to foster informed and inclusive 
public discourse, Congress and the Commission have had the op-
portunity to ensure that these tasks are performed in a nonpartisan, 
balanced way, while at the same time maintaining significant gov-
ernment distance from the formation of public opinion. Following 
more than a century of domination of the newspaper industry by 
papers affiliated with political parties, the notion of neutral, non-
partisan media arose with television after World War II.216 This 
objectivity is important because the news media, including most 
broadcasters, are responsible for enabling citizens to form in-
formed, thoughtful opinions on public policy.217 And because the 
                                                                                                                            
214 Filipe R. Campante & Daniel A. Hojman, Media and Polarization, 1, 20 (Yale U. 
Leitner Program Working Paper, Nov. 2010), available at http://www.yale.edu/
leitner/resources/papers/CampanteHojman_Nov_2010.pdf (“TV was unquestionably a 
highly accessible medium. It required considerably less attention and cognitive ability 
than newspapers or magazines. As such, it was also much more amenable to the kind of 
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which Americans bought them upon the introduction of TV broadcasting belies this 
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SURVEY, (Sept. 2, 2013), available at http://www.journalism.org/files/2013/10/
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216 Groeling & Engstrom, supra note 213, at 20. 
217 See generally WALTER LIPPMAN, PUBLIC OPINION (1920). Such objectivity is not 
always easy to find. Cable television has bred partisan news channels that have been 
demonstrated to impact the behavior of voters and, directly, the behavior of elected 
representatives. Kevin Arcenaux, Martin Johnson, Rene Lindstaedt, and Ryan J. Vander 
Wielen, Democratic Representation and the Emergence of Partisan News Media: Investigating 
Dynamic Partisanship in Congress, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
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democratic legitimacy of the state “flows from the accountability of 
the state to the public opinion of its population,” it is vital that the 
formation of public opinion not be unduly influenced by the gov-
ernment.218 As Robert Post notes, it is for this reason that “from its 
inception . . . First Amendment doctrine has primarily sought to 
protect from government regulation an independent realm of 
speech within which public opinion is understood to be forged.”219 
Congress has thus given private broadcasters an important role 
to play in serving the public—a role that cannot not be performed 
either by an open forum or by government-controlled broadcasting. 
It is the very fact of broadcasters’ independence that enables 
broadcasters to serve the public as Congress conceived. And this 
independence lies at the heart of the Court’s observation that the 
constitutionality of broadcast regulation depends upon careful cali-
bration of the First Amendment interests of the public and those of 
broadcasters.220 
Where Congress seeks to further a particular speech interest 
through broadcast regulation—intervening in the media market to 
correct the underproduction of a public good, as it has in the case 
of reasonable access221—courts should insist that the FCC use 
rules well adapted to the legislative objectives of the statute it is 
implementing.222 “When the Government defends a regulation on 
speech . . . [i]t must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, 
                                                                                                                            
abstract_id=2324786. Neither do Internet media organizations appear to be good 
candidates to act as general-interest intermediaries for public discourse. Not only is 
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220 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 650 (1994) (“The FCC is well 
aware of the limited nature of its jurisdiction, having acknowledged that it ‘has no 
authority and, in fact, is barred by the First Amendment and [§ 326 of the 
Communications Act] from interfering with the free exercise of [broadcasters’] 
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Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973). 
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not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate 
these harms in a direct and material way.”223 Not only is the pub-
lic’s right “to be fully and broadly informed on matters of public 
importance . . . not well served by” a restriction whose net effect is 
“to diminish rather than to augment ‘the volume and quality’” of 
speech,224 but the Commission’s failure to maintain a close fit be-
tween means and ends undermines the constitutional basis for re-
stricting broadcasters’ speech.225 If broadcasters’ First Amend-
ment speech rights are to have any content at all, it must be the 
case that government interference with broadcasters’ programming 
choices can be justified only to the extent that countervailing inter-
ests are actually furthered. Broad, prophylactic rules that under-
mine broadcasters’ exercise of editorial freedom without netting a 
proportional gain in some other similarly important interest simply 
cannot be reconciled with the idea that broadcasters “are engaged 
in a vital and independent form of communicative activity” such 
that “the First Amendment must inform and give shape to the 
manner in which Congress”—and by extension, the FCC—
“exercises its regulatory power.”226 
B. Reasonable Access and the Means-Ends Fit of the Commission’s 
Prophylactic Rule 
In this Part III.B, I examine the relationship between the legis-
lative aims of reasonable access and the Commission’s choice of a 
prophylactic rule requiring a broadcaster to grant access to an indi-
vidual on the ballot for a federal race, even where there is strong 
evidence that such individual is not seeking to gain office. I argue 
that this rule has significant potential to burden broadcasters’ 
speech and to reduce the opportunities for genuine candidates to 
speak directly to the public through the broadcast medium. I then 
propose an alternative policy that, I believe, would better achieve 
the legislative purposes of reasonable access and would burden less 
speech. 
                                                                                                                            
223 Turner, 512 U.S. at 664. 
224 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 398–99. 
225 See id. at 379 n.12 (“[W]ere it to be shown by the Commission that the fairness 
doctrine ‘[h]as the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing speech,’ we would then 
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226 Id. at 364. 
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1. The Ends of Reasonable Access 
In enacting the reasonable access provision as part of the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act, Congress sought to further an interest 
central to the First Amendment.227 The Supreme Court has em-
phasized, “In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability 
of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for 
office is essential, for the identities of those who are elected will 
inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation.”228 Congress 
enacted reasonable access to “give candidates for public office 
greater access to the media so that they [could] better explain their 
stand on the issues, and thereby more fully and completely inform 
the voters.”229 This purpose is unrelated to the suppression of 
speech. As the Court has recognized, reasonable access “makes a 
significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the 
ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, informa-
tion necessary for the effective operation of the democratic 
process.”230 And like the cable regulation at issue in Turner, rea-
sonable access is “not activated by any particular message spoken” 
by broadcasters, and Congress has “confer[red] benefits upon all 
[legally qualified federal candidates] whatever the content of their 
programming.”231 
Nonetheless, because any grant of access rights to broadcast 
stations necessarily reduces the time available for other speech,232 
the Court in CBS, Inc. v. FCC emphasized the “limited” nature of 
the reasonable access right in upholding it against a First Amend-
ment challenge by broadcasters.233 As conceived of by the Court, 
reasonable access is narrow in scope, “pertain[ing] only to federal 
candidates,” and narrow in its foreseeable application, being “in-
voked by [federal candidates] only for the purpose of advancing 
                                                                                                                            
227 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 
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their candidacies once a campaign has commenced.”234 The Court 
also emphasized that broadcasters retain the power to make indivi-
dualized judgments in response to requests for access, and that the 
FCC would “‘provide leeway to broadcasters and not merely at-
tempt de novo to determine the reasonableness of their judg-
ments.’”235 
2. The Commission’s Employment of Its Prophylactic Rule 
The interpretation of reasonable access employed by the FCC 
in its October 2012 decisions—requiring broadcasters to grant 
access to any person on the ballot for federal office, even where 
there is strong evidence that an individual is not seeking office—is 
not nearly so cabined as the Court’s description of the candidate 
right in CBS, Inc. v. FCC. The Commission’s policy enables per-
sons wishing merely to get the attention of the public to circumvent 
broadcaster review and to use airtime for any purpose. By essential-
ly disguising themselves as candidates and, thereby, disguising 
their issue advocacy as candidate speech, these individuals gain 
access to a limited commodity—broadcast time—thereby displac-
ing the speech of others. 
The Commission’s employment of this prophylactic rule is 
problematic for at least three reasons. First, requiring stations to 
grant access to pretextual candidates does not further the legisla-
tive aims of reasonable access. The purpose of reasonable access is 
not to provide a right of access to broadcast stations for persons 
who wish to discuss public issues, something Congress has consi-
dered and declined to do on multiple occasions.236 Reasonable 
access was instead meant to provide voters with information about 
those who seek to govern them. Fully informed voting requires an 
understanding of who a candidate is and what views he or she 
holds,237 and Congress decided that this interest would best be 
served by granting federal candidates the opportunity directly to 
                                                                                                                            
234 Id. 
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236 See supra Part I.A. 
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address the public. Issue advocacy simply does not serve this pur-
pose.238 
Second, requiring stations to air the messages of pretextual 
candidates does not simply add more political speech to the mix. 
Rather, to the extent that, as I discuss above in Parts II.A and II.B, 
increasing incentives to game the system cause more individuals 
disingenuously to present themselves as federal candidates, this 
behavior has significant potential to crowd out the speech of candi-
dates who are genuinely seeking to gain office.239 Insofar as reason-
able access furthers First Amendment values by “enhancing the 
ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, informa-
tion necessary for the effective operation of the democratic 
process,”240 implementing the statute in such a way as to diminish 
communications from genuine candidates to the electorate under-
mines this constitutional justification for interference with broad-
casters’ programming decisions. 
In determining how much time to sell each candidate, broad-
casters must take into account the number of federal candidates 
entitled to invoke political broadcasting rights.241 For example, in a 
Presidential election year, a Washington, D.C. station must ensure 
that it has adequate inventory of advertising time to provide rea-
sonable access to, and to accommodate equal opportunities claims 
of, all candidates for President and the Senate race in each of the 
four states covered by the station’s broadcast signal,242 as well as 
for all of the candidates on the ballot for the House in each of the 
                                                                                                                            
238 One could, of course, argue that issue advocacy serves other First Amendment 
purposes and that the Commission could constitutionally implement an affirmative right 
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fifteen Congressional districts.243 The more candidates there are on 
these ballots, the greater is the likelihood that broadcasters will 
need to hold back additional inventory from candidates who have 
already purchased time, or even to limit an initial purchase of time, 
in order to ensure that some time remains available for purchase by 
others on the ballot who are entitled to access, including pretextual 
candidates.244 While broadcasters could take some measures to in-
crease exposure for bona fide federal candidates, such as holding 
debates that exclude pretextual candidates245 or increasing news 
coverage of bona fide candidates,246 such measures alone cannot 
compensate for the loss of candidates’ unmoderated opportunities 
to speak directly to voters—the value of which is the rationale for 
giving candidates reasonable access rights in the first place.247 
Moreover, while state candidates or proponents of state ballot 
initiatives have no federal rights equivalent to reasonable access, 
broadcasters are expected to keep viewers informed on state and 
local races as part of their obligation to serve the public interest and 
typically do sell time to candidates for state office.248 However, 
when inventory becomes scarce, broadcasters may choose not to 
provide state candidates direct access to viewers by selling them 
advertising time, instead limiting broadcast coverage of state races 
to news programs. Requiring broadcasters to sell time to pretextual 
federal candidates thus perversely privileges the sale of access to 
pretextual candidates over access by genuine state candidates. In 
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this way, the Commission’s policy has the potential not only to un-
dermine the purposes of and constitutional justifications for rea-
sonable access with regard to federal candidates, but to reduce 
speech by state candidates as well. 
Finally, forced access by pretextual candidates for their dis-
guised issue advocacy necessarily burdens broadcasters’ own 
speech activities, including broadcasters’ exercise of editorial dis-
cretion in selecting programming that most effectively contributes 
to the coherent, balanced mix they believe will best serve their 
viewers. “To agree that debate on public issues should be ‘robust, 
and wide-open’ does not mean that we should exchange ‘public 
trustee’ broadcasting . . . for a system of self-appointed editorial 
commentators.”249 
Not only does time provided under any mandatory access 
scheme take away time the broadcaster would otherwise have been 
free to program, but the burden placed on broadcasters’ editorial 
freedom by being required to provide time to pretextual candidates 
is significant in an additional respect. Because broadcasters are 
prohibited from censoring candidate ads,250 they are unable to pre-
vent candidates from airing material that is misleading, false, defa-
matory, or otherwise irrational or uncivil. Fortunately, people hop-
ing to win elections usually do not want to come across as untrust-
worthy, irrational, or uncivil. However, the very fact that broadcas-
ters cannot censor candidate ads appears to motivate individuals 
who wish to air this kind of content to become pretextual candi-
dates.251 Unlike broadcasters, who are accountable to viewers and 
to the FCC for their programming choices,252 and genuine candi-
dates, who are accountable to voters for how they portray them-
selves in their campaign advertisements, pretextual candidates—
who do not seek to win votes—are accountable to no one.253 Insofar 
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as the primary task of broadcasters as independent editors is to 
present a selection of programming that will inform discussion of 
public issues and foster conversation across societal divides,254 the 
forced inclusion of material by pretextual candidates is likely to be 
counterproductive.255 
C. An Alternative Approach 
As discussed throughout this Article, Congress and the Su-
preme Court have long recognized that broadcast regulation re-
quires careful calibration of the First Amendment interests on both 
sides of the equation. To the extent possible, any burden on broad-
caster speech should be balanced out by a gain in another speech 
interest. In some cases, this fine-tuning might be difficult to 
achieve or might be particularly burdensome for the government. 
In such instances, a court evaluating a challenge to a statute, or to 
an FCC rule or policy, might determine that the importance of fur-
thering the public’s First Amendment interests necessitates that a 
broadcaster carry some speech that does not itself further those 
interests. Where, however, a low-cost alternative policy exists that 
would burden less speech, courts should reject the government’s 
choice of a more burdensome policy. This is especially true where 
the alternative policy would also better achieve the government’s 
objectives. 
At least one such alternative exists here. In place of its informal 
prophylactic rule, the Commission could instead allow—either 
through a revised interpretation of the statutory reasonable access 
requirement or, if it deems necessary, through an amendment to 
the relevant FCC rules—broadcaster evaluation of whether an in-
dividual on the ballot for a federal race is a “bona fide candi-
date.”256 In other words, the Commission could permit broadcas-
ters to evaluate available evidence in order to determine whether 
such an individual is genuinely seeking to gain public office, rather 
than simply seeking to gain a platform for speech. 
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In fact, the Commission has already formulated neutral factors 
for making such a determination. As discussed above in Part I.B, 
under FCC rules, where a person claims reasonable access rights 
on the basis of a federal write-in candidacy, broadcast stations may 
ask the purported candidate to show that he has substantially un-
dertaken activities commonly associated with political campaign-
ing.257 These activities “normally would include making campaign 
speeches, distributing campaign literature, issuing press releases, 
maintaining a campaign committee, and establishing a campaign 
headquarters.”258 
A similar set of criteria could be evaluated where a person 
claiming reasonable access rights is on the ballot for a federal race. 
There is no reason to think that broadcasters are incapable of ap-
plying such criteria in a nondiscriminatory manner. Broadcasters 
are already accustomed to engaging in, and indeed are required to 
engage in, individualized evaluation of what constitutes reasonable 
access under all of the circumstances present in each particular 
case.259 And broadcasters are experienced with evaluating, in the 
write-in context, whether a purported candidate has engaged in 
enough campaigning activity to be considered a bona fide candi-
date. The FCC has not expressed concern that broadcasters are 
doing a poor job conducting this review, nor has the Commission 
indicated that its review of broadcasters’ decisions has been admi-
nistratively burdensome. 
Admittedly, permitting broadcasters to evaluate the substan-
tiality of a purported candidate’s campaigning activity is no fool-
proof method to weed out all who would attempt to abuse candi-
date political broadcast rights. A person who is willing to invest suf-
ficient time and energy in campaigning, even if he is doing it in or-
der to gain access to broadcast stations for issue advocacy, would 
be able to pass this test. Nonetheless, as the Commission undoub-
tedly understood when it decided to require a substantial showing 
of bona fide candidacy for write-in candidates, such a burden would 
make a strategy of disingenuously invoking reasonable access rights 
                                                                                                                            
257 Id. §§ 73.1940(b)(2), 73.1940(f). 
258 Id. § 73.1940(f). 
259 See, e.g., Complaint of Carter–Mondale Presidential Committee, 74 F.C.C.2d 631, 
642–43 (1979). 
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significantly less attractive—not to mention harder for the same 
person to carry out in multiple locations.260 For that reason, em-
ployment of this policy would infringe less on broadcasters’ speech 
activities—and would leave time for more speech by genuine can-
didates—than would the bright-line rule employed by the Commis-
sion in its October 2012 decisions. It would, therefore, help narrow 
the scope of the FCC’s interpretation of reasonable access to one 
more consistent with the purpose of, and the constitutional justifi-
cation for, reasonable access. 
CONCLUSION 
How to conceive of the First Amendment rights of broadcas-
ters—and indeed whether such rights should be placed on the scale 
at all, opposite the rights of the public as listeners and viewers—
has been contested for decades. In other First Amendment con-
texts, it is the right of the speaker, not of the listener, that is para-
mount. Yet in the broadcast context, Congress sought to ensure 
that a new communications technology would develop in a way that 
would best serve the needs of all Americans, rather than the fortu-
nate few who acquired licenses to speak. 
In this Article, I have demonstrated that the reasonable access 
right for federal candidates, as conceived of by the Supreme Court 
in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, can be justified on the basis of our collective 
right to receive information necessary to make informed choices 
among candidates for office. Under a theory of free speech that 
conceives one of its fundamental purposes as the furtherance of 
democracy, such a legislative aim must be considered constitution-
ally permissible. Nonetheless, because the First Amendment also 
values both editorial freedom and the autonomy of all persons par-
                                                                                                                            
260 See, e.g., Complaint of Randall Terry, 27 FCC Rcd. 598 (Feb. 3, 2012) (finding that it 
was not unreasonable for a station to deny access to Terry where his campaign stops in 
Illinois were limited to a small geographic section of the state and the only piece of 
literature he claimed to have distributed “was labeled ‘generic brochure’ and lacked the 
legal disclaimers required for public dissemination, suggesting that it was never physically 
distributed in the state”). Note that in the context of write-in candidacy for President, a 
candidate who has made a substantial showing of bona fide candidacy in at least ten states 
is considered a legally qualified candidate in all states. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1940(e)(2) (2013). If 
the FCC were to adopt the alternative policy I propose here for ballot candidates, a 
similar allowance could be made for presidential candidates. 
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ticipating in public discourse, the view that private broadcasters 
have retained no independent speech rights cannot be correct. 
Therefore, the policies the FCC selects to implement reasonable 
access should burden no more speech than necessary to achieve its 
legislative purposes. As I have shown, the prophylactic rule em-
ployed by the Commission in its October 2012 decisions was im-
precise and, in fact, counterproductive. In proposing an alternative 
policy that would burden less broadcaster and candidate speech, I 
offer a solution that attempts to further the democratic goals of 
reasonable access while also protecting the editorial freedom of 
broadcasters. 
